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BILLBOARD CONTROL UNDER THE IDGHWAY 
" BEAUTIFICATION ACT OF 1965 
Roger A. Cunningham* 
I. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
A. Title I of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 
In a nation of continental size, transportation is essential to the 
growth and prosperity of the national economy. 
But that economy, and the roads that serve it, are not ends in 
themselves. They are meant to serve the real needs of the people of 
this country. And those needs include the opportunity to touch 
nature and see beauty, as well as rising income and swifter travel. 
Therefore, we must make sure that the massive resources we now 
devote to roads also serve to improve and broaden the quality of 
American life.1 
THIS statement by President Johnson signified an important change in federal-aid highway policy. As two leading commenta-
tors observed, "[i]t clearly implied that henceforth highways should 
be viewed not only as facilities of transportation but as features of 
the community and environment, and that environmental quality 
ranked with engineering quality in roadbuilding."2 To carry out the 
new policy, the Johnson Administration, in May 1965, submitted a 
bill to Congress requiring each state to establish, by January I, 1968, 
controls over roadside advertising and junkyards along interstate and 
primary federal-aid highways, on penalty of forfeiting all federal 
highway funds to which the state would otherwise be entitled.3 In 
addition, the Administration bill included provisions allocating to 
each state, on a nonmatching basis, federal funds for "acquisition of 
interests in and improvement of strips of land necessary for the resto-
ration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to 
such roads."4 This bill, with congressional revisions, became the 
Highway Beautification Act of 1965.5 
While the Highway Beautification Act as a whole is designed to 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. S.B., J.D., Harvard University.-Ed. 
I. H.R. Doc. No. 191, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) (letter of President Johnson). 
2. R. NETHERTON &: M. MARKHAM, ROADSIDE DEV:c:LOPMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION: LEGAL 
AUTHORITY AND METHODS pt. II, at 12 (Highway Research Board, 1966). 
3. S. 2084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Title I of the bill dealt with highway advertis-
ing; title II contained junkyard control provisions. 
4. S. 2084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. III, § 3 (1965). 
5. Pub. L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028 (codified at 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (1970)). 
The Highway Beautification Act became effective on October 22, 1965. 
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be a comprehensive program to promote the scenic enhancement of 
highways, this Article will focus on title I, 6 which deals with control 
of outdoor advertising. Title II, which deals with junkyard control, 
is similar to title I, but it has not given rise to the problems and 
controversy produced by title I. Title III, which provides for land-
scaping and scenic enhancement of federal-aid highways, is quite 
different from titles I and II. 
The main thrust of title I is reasonably clear. Unless a state is 
willing to accept a ten per cent reduction in its portion of federal 
highway funds it must establish "effective control" of outdoor adver-
tising along the interstate and primary federal-aid highways within its 
boundaries.7 "Effective control" means that no signs visible from the 
6. Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-285, tit. I, 79 Stat. 1028. 
Section 101 of title I completely changed the substance of section 131 of title 23 of the 
United States Code (originally codified by the Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-767, 
72 Stat. 904). Section 102 simply amended the table of section headings in 23 U.S.C. by 
striking out the old section heading, "131. Areas adjacent to the Interstate System,'' and 
inserting in lieu thereof, "131. Control of outdoor advertising." Although technically all 
the lettered paragraphs of title I are subsections of section 101, for convenience they 
will be referred to in this Article as subsections of title I, since section 102 of the Act 
contains no substantive provisions. 
7. Title I, subsection (a), 23 U.S.C. § 13l(a) (1970), states the congressional finding 
and declaration that "the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, 
displays, and devices in areas adjacent to the Interstate System and the primary system 
should be controlled in order to protect the public investment in such highways, to 
promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural 
beauty." 
Subsection (b) states that if a state has not, by January 1, 1968, provided for ef-
fective control of the erection and maintenance along the interstate and primary systems 
of outdoor advertising signs within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way and 
visible from the main traveled way, that state's annual apportionments of highway 
construction funds under section 104 of title 23 of the United States Code shall be 
reduced by ten per cent of the amount that would otherwise be apportioned, until the 
state provides for such control. The ten per cent penalty applies to the state's portion 
of funds, not only for the interstate and federal-aid primary systems, but also for the 
federal-aid secondary system and the urban extensions of the primary and secondary 
systems. Any amount withheld under subsection (b) is to be reapportioned to the other 
states. The Secretary of Transportation is to determine whether a state has made pro-
vision for the effective control of outdoor advertising. Whenever he determines it to be 
in the public interest, he may suspend, for such periods as he deems necessary, the ap-
plication of the ten per cent penalty to a state. 
It should be noted that the decision to use a penalty provision represented a major 
change in federal-aid policy, since use of financial penalties was considered and re-
jected by Congress in 1958, see R. NETHERTON & M. MARKHAM, supra note 2, pt. II, at 
48-49, in favor of encouraging state implementation of the national policy on roadside 
advertising by increasing financial aid to states that enacted sign controls. This approach 
was embodied in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, § 12, 72 
Stat. 96, which provided for a bonus of one half of one per cent of the federal-aid 
highway funds otherwise allocated to a particular state. For a discussion of the 1958 
law and the national standards promulgated thereunder, see Enfield, Control of Outdoor 
Advertising: Federal Law and Standards, in 1961 REPORT OF THE COMMIITEE ON ROAD-
SIDE DEVELOPMENT 54 (Highway Research Board); BLACK, NATIONAL POLICY AND STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO CONTROL OF ROADSIDE Al>\'ERTISiNG ALONG THE INTERSTATE SYSIEM 3-6 
(Highway Research Board Bulletin No. 337, 1962); R. NETHERTON & M. MARKHAM, supra, 
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main travelled way shall be permitted within 660 feet of the high-
way right-of-way unless exempted by the Act.8 The several broad ex-
emptions that are created by the Act include all advertising signs in 
zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas, 9 as well as official 
signs and signs advertising the sale or lease of the property on which 
they are located or other activity "conducte'd. on the property in which 
they are located."10 In practice, this means that almost all existing 
off-premises advertising signs in rural areas will be prohibited, 11 since 
few rural areas contain sections zoned or developed for commercial or 
industrial use. In urban areas, most of the existing off-premises adver-
tising signs are located in areas zoned for commercial or industrial use 
and consequently will not be subject to removal under title I unless 
they fail to conform to certain size, lighting, and spacing standards.12 
New off-premises advertising signs may be established in commercial 
and industrial areas so long as they conform to such standards, which 
must be "consistent with customary use."13 
In areas zoned for commercial or industrial use what is "custom-
ary use" with respect to the size, lighting, and spacing of off-premises 
advertising signs may be determined either by the local zoning au-
thority or by agreement between the state and the Secretary of Trans-
portation.14 The definition of an unzoned commercial or industrial 
pt. II, at 48-50. The national standards, as promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce, 
were published in 23 Fed. Reg. 8793 (1958), and may now be found, as amended, in 23 
C.F.R. §§ 750.101-.110 (1973). Pertinent administrative directives were issued by the 
Bureau of Public Roads. See U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, Dept. of Commerce, Policy 
and Procedure Memorandum 21-4.S (January 22, 1963) (relating to acquisition of adver-
tising rights); U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, Dept. of Commerce, Policy and Procedure 
Memorandum 30-8 (January 22, 1963) (dealing with incentive payments for controlling 
outdoor advertising on the interstate system). 
The House Public Works Committee's decision to impose only a ten per cent penalty 
instead of the one hundred per cent penalty proposed in the Administration bill (com-
pare H.R. REP. No. 1084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 HousE Rfil>oRT), 
with S. 2084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, § 1 (1965)), represents a significant modification 
of the policy, since it substantially reduces the pressure for state compliance with title I. 
8. Title I, subsection (d), 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970). Since the lettered paragraphs of 
title I correspond to those in 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1970), this Article will refer to the sub-
sections of title I and section 131 interchangeably. 
9. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970). 
10. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (1970). 
11. See Hearings on S. 561 and S. 1142 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate 
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate Hear-
ings] _(exhibit submitted fo~ the record by ~e Roadside Business Association), indicating 
that m rural areas approximately 839,000 signs (seventy-one per cent of the off-premise 
signs in the United States) would have to be removed. 
12. But see id., indi_cating that, by means of 1!1e. agr~ements entered into by the 
former Bureau of Public Roads and the states, existing signs that are nonconforming 
only because they violate size, lighting, or spacing regulations will be allowed to remain. 
13. 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) (1970). 
14. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970). 
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area, as well as the standards for signs in these areas, is to be deter-
mined "by agreement between the several States and the Secretary."15 
Off-premises advertising signs erected in areas not exempt under 
title I are to be removed whether they were erected before or after 
enactment of the Act and whether they were lawfully or unlawfully 
erected. The states are to use their police power, to the extent con-
stitutionally possible, to remove any signs that were unlawfully 
erected either before or after the enactment. But, as a general rule, 
"just compensation" is to be given upon removal of lawfully erected 
off-premises signs.16 
B. Title I: Some Problems of Construction 
Unfortunately, title I is not well drafted, in part because it repre-
sents an uneasy compromise between those members of Congress who 
wanted little, if any, control of outdoor advertising along the high-
ways and those members who wanted very stringent controls. For ex-
ample, the provisions of subsection (d) allowing advertising signs 
within 660 feet of the right-of-way in areas zoned or established 
(though unzoned) as industrial or commercial areas were a response 
15. 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) (1970). 
16. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(g) (1970). In all cases, the federal share of compensation is to 
be 75 per cent. But a new subsection (n), added by amendment in 1968, Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(d), 82 Stat. 817, provides that no 
advertising sign shall be required to be removed if the federal share is not available. 
The rest of title I can be summarized as follows: Subsection (e) provides that no sign 
lawfully in existence along the interstate or primary systems on September 1, 1965, 
which does not conform to the requirements of title I, shall be required to be removed 
until July 1, 1970, and that no other lawfully erected sign shall be required to be re-
moved until the end of the fifth year after it becomes nonconforming. 
The Secretary is expressly authorized by subsection (j) to continue the bonus payments 
provided for by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 to any state highway department 
that, prior to July 1, 1965, entered into an agreement with the Secretary to control out-
door advertising signs in areas adjacent to the interstate system. Subsection (j) originally 
provided for continuation of bonus payments provided "the State maintains the control 
required under such agreement or the control required by this section, whichever con-
trol is stricter." A 1968 amendment eliminated the requirement that the state meet the 
stricter of the two standards, thus assuring that bonus payments will be continued so 
long as a state "maintains the control required under such agreement." Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(b), 82 Stat. 817. However, the final sen-
tence in subsection (j) provides that nothing in that subsection shall be "construed to 
exempt any State from controlling outdoor advertising as otherwise provided in" title I. 
Thus, a state may continue to qualify for bonus payments of one half of one per cent 
under the 1958 Act and at the same time be subject to the ten per cent penalty for 
failure to comply with the requirements of title I of the 1965 Act. 
Subsection (k) provides that nothing in title I shall prohibit a state from establishing 
stricter standards than those established under that title. 
Subsection (l) provides for judicial review in the United States district courts of any 
final determination by the Secretary of Transportation to withhold funds from a state 
under subsection (b) because of its failure to provide for effective control. 
1300 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1295 
to pressure from the billboard industry and the roadside business 
associations. Pressure from these interests is also evident in the ex-
planatory language that introduces subsection (d)-"In order to pro-
mote the reasonable, orderly and effective display of outdoor adver-
tising while remaining consistent with the purpose of this section 
. . ." -a phrase that may cause much difficulty because it can be 
construed as stating a second congressional purpose for enactment of 
title I, in addition to that stated in subsection (a).17 Moreover, the 
Administration bill, as originally introduced in May 1965, merely 
authorized the use of the states' police power to control roadside 
advertising; but in response to pressure from the billboard and road-
side business interests, the Senate Public "\-Vorks Committee inserted 
the compensation provision now found in subsection (g).18 
In part, however, the poor draftsmanship of title I is a result of 
the lack of adequate consideration that characterized its passage by 
Congress. One consequence of this was that the draftsmen frequently 
used unclear or ambiguous language, thus leaving a number of dif-
ficult constructional problems, none of which has been authoritatively 
resolved by the United States Supreme Court. I propose to deal here 
with the following problems of construction: (1) What does "effective 
control" of outdoor advertising under subsections (b) and (c) mean in 
light of subsection (k)? (2) What is the meaning and effect of subsec-
tion (d)? (3) What is the meaning and effect of subsections (e) and (n) 
in light of subsection (k)? (4 )What is the meaning and effect of the 
provision in subsection (g) for payment of "just compensation" upon 
removal of nonconforming outdoor advertising signs? 
I. "Effective Control" of Outdoor Advertising Under 
Subsections (b) and ( c ), in Light of Subsection (k ). 
Subsection (b), the operative provision of title I, requires the 
states to provide for "effective control" of certain signs in order to 
17. The provisions of subsection (d), as finally adopted, were hailed by the billboard 
industry: "For the first time, it is an admission by a governmental body that outdoor 
advertising can legitimately conduct business in commercial and industrial areas of 
this country. And it will help to weed out the fly-by-night operators who have been 
the bane of the industry." Editorial, Seize the };foment, PENNSYLVANIA OUIDOOR NEWS, 
November 1965, at 2. Although subsection (d) is drawn in such broad terms as to include 
all kinds of advertising signs, its principal impact is to permit "off-premises" signs-i.e., 
signs not within the classes exempted by subsection (c)-in zoned and unzoned com-
mercial and industrial areas. 
18. The explanation given for this change was that the Highway Beautification Act 
would apply to the federal-aid primary system as well as to the interstate system and 
that payment of compensation would be necessary to avoid disastrous economic effects 
on the billboard industry and the small roadside businesses that had developed together 
with the primary road system over a period of 40 to 50 years. 111 CONG, REc. 12797-98 
(1965) (remarks of Sen. Cooper). 
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avoid the ten per cent penalty. Subsection (c) defines "effective con-
trol" as described above. 19 But subsection (k.) provides that nothing 
in title I "shall prohibit a state from establishing standards imposing 
stricter limitations with respect to signs, displays, and devices on the 
federal-aid highway systems than those established under" title I. 
The legislative history indicates that this provision was "to make it 
clear that there is no attempt by the federal government to pre-empt 
the field to the extent that only federal regulation may be used to 
control advertising along the highways."20 It is not clear, however, 
exactly what Congress meant by the use of the terms "standards" and 
"limitations." 
After a perusal of all the committee hearings, 21 committee re-
ports, 22 and floor debates23 that preceded enactment of the Highway 
Beautification Act, I have concluded that subsection (k.) was designed 
to allow the states to impose stricter limitations than those required 
by subsections (b) and (c), by means of standards embodied in 
state statutes or local ordinances enacted pursuant to state enabling 
legislation. That is, subsection (k.) makes it clear that none of the 
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are intended to give commercial 
sign owners a federal right to maintain advertising signs either more 
than 660 feet from the right-of-way or within the 660 foot strip. 
2. Subsection ( d): The Commercial and Industrial 
Area Exceptions 
No part of title I has generated more controversy than subsection 
(d), which permits outdoor advertising signs 
whose size, lighting and spacing, consistent with customary use is to 
be determined by agreement between the several States and the Sec-
retary, ... within areas adjacent to the Interstate and primary systems 
which are zoned industrial or commercial under authority of State 
19. See text accompanying note 8 supra. 
20. 1965 HousE REl'oRT, supra note 7, at 9. See also S. REP. No. 709, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 6 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 SENATE REPORT): "The committee emphasizes that where 
State or local law imposes more stringent controls than S. 2084 over outdoor advertising 
signs, displays, or devices-both on and off premise-the intent is that State or local 
law shall prevail. It is not the intent of the committee that the provisions of this section 
shall preempt or weaken State or local laws imposing more rigid requirements." 
21. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2081 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. 
on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 48, 72-73, 102-03, 107-10, 114, 391 (1965) [herein-
after 1965 Senate Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 8187 Before the Subcomm. on Roads 
of the House Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70, 128-31, 247-50 (1965) 
[hereinafter 1965 House Hearings]. 
22. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., 111 CoNG. R.Ec. 23878-79 (remarks of Sen. Fong), 26164 (letter from 
Undersecretary of Commerce Boyd to Rep. Edmondson), 26263-65 (colloquy between 
Reps. Meeds, Edmondson, and Adams), 26279 (remarks of Rep. McVicker) (1965). 
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law, or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas as may be deter-
mined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary, 
and which further provides that the states 
shall have full authority under their own zoning laws to zone areas 
for commercial or industrial purposes, and the actions of the States 
in this regard will be accepted for the purposes of this Act.24 
The language of subsection ( d) is permissive rather than manda-
tory. Therefore, even without subsection (k.), I would conclude that 
a state statute or local ordinance dealing with control of outdoor 
advertising need not include the blanket exemption for off-premises 
signs in commercial and industrial areas that is permitted by sub-
section (d). 
Unfortunately, subsection (d) presents more difficult interpreta-
tive problems: What is "customary use"? How is "agreement between 
the several States and the Secretary" to be effected? Is the author-
ity of the states to zone areas for commercial and industrial use 
absolute for title I purposes? 
On January 10, 1967, after holding fifty-two public hearings 
throughout the United States, the former Bureau of Public Roads 
presented to Congress a set of "proposed standards and criteria for 
size, lighting and spacing of signs permitted in commercial or indus-
trial zones and areas," including a proposed definition of an "unzoned 
commercial or industrial area" for outdoor advertising control pur-
poses.25 These proposed standards and criteria were expressly stated 
to be merely "a basis on which to establish agreements between the 
several States and the Secretary."26 But they were met with massive 
objections and criticism from the advertising industry during the 
1967 hearings of the Subcommittee on Roads of the House Public 
Works Committee,27 principally on the grounds that they were too 
restrictive and that the Bureau was seeking to force the states to 
accept them instead of trying to work out standards and criteria 
through a true process of negotiations. The attitude of the House 
Subcommittee during the hearings was markedly hostile toward the 
whole highway beautification program in general and title I in par-
ticular. As a consequence of this pressure, Secretary Boyd on May 24, 
24. 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) .(1970). 
25. S. Doc. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-49 (1967). 
26. Id. at 45. 
27. Hearings on H.R. 7797 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House Comm. on 
Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 House Hearings] (opening 
statement of Chairman Kluczynski). 
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1967, shortly after the conclusion of the Subcommittee hearings, sent 
a letter to Chairman Kluczynski in which he made the following 
concessions on behalf of the Department of Transportation in regard 
to zoned areas: 
I. As the law directs, we are fully prepared to accept state deter-
minations with respect to zoned commercial and industrial areas. 
2. Concerning unzoned commercial and industrial areas, we shall 
be happy to request the guidance and suggestions of the several States 
with respect to designating these areas. The only absolute require-
ment upon which we would insist would be the existence of at least 
one commercial activity in any such area. Surely this could not be 
considered unreasonable. 
3. With regard to the determination of what constitutes "custom-
ary use" in the zoned commercial and industrial areas, we shall be 
glad to look to the states for certification that either the state au-
thority or a bona fide local zoning authority has made such a deter-
mination. With respect to unzoned areas, we will recognize local 
practice on customary use as mutually agreed to by State and Federal 
agencies. It ·will be our policy to assume the good faith of the several 
states in this regard. 
The only exception to the above would be a situation in which a 
State or local authority might attempt to circumvent the law by zon-
ing an area as "commercial" for billboard purposes only. We think 
you will agree that this is a reasonable position, since we know that 
the Congress does not wish for the law to be deliberately evaded by 
subterfuge. 
4. What is determined in good faith by a bona fide local or state 
zoning authority as "customary use" will be an acceptable basis for 
standards as to size, spacing, and lighting in the commercial and 
industrial areas within the geographical jurisdiction of that state or 
local authority.2s 
The concessions in Secretary Boyd's letter marked a substantial 
retreat from the positions previously taken by the Bureau of Public 
Roads, but opponents of title I (both in and out of Congress) were not 
satisfied. The House version of the 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act29 
would virtually have killed title I by eliminating the ten per cent 
penalty provided by subsection (b) and making the control of outdoor 
advertising entirely voluntary on the part of the states.30 In addition, 
the House version would have vested in the states or their political 
28. Letter from Alan S. Boyd, Secretary of Transportation, to Rep. John Kluczynski, 
May 24, 1967, in Hearings on S. 1467 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate 
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings]. 
29. H.R. 17134, passed by the House, July 3, 1968, in 114 CONG. R.Ec. 19945 (1968). 
30. H.R. 17134, § 6(a), passed by the House, July 3, 1968, in 114 CONG. R.Ec. 19945 
(1968). 
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subdivisions the power to define "unzoned commercial and industrial 
areas" and to determine "customary use" with respect to the size, 
lighting, and spacing of advertising signs in both zoned and unzoned 
commercial and industrial areas.31 However, the bill that emerged 
from the Conference Committee and was finally enacted32 left sub-
section (b) of title I without change and amended subsection (d) only 
by adding the following provision: "Whenever a bona fide State, 
county or local zoning authority has made a determination of custom-
ary use, such determination will be accepted in lieu of controls by 
agreement in the zoned commercial and industrial areas within the 
geographical jurisdiction of such authority."33 
As subsection ( d) now stands, regulation of off-premises adver-
tising in areas zoned for commercial or industrial use would seem to 
be entirely within the discretion of the state or local zoning agency 
that has jurisdiction over the area. Presumably, the state or local 
agency may either include regulations with respect to the size, light-
ing, and spacing of advertising signs within its general regulations 
dealing with commercial and industrial districts, or adopt a special 
set of regulations defining "customary use." The only possible limi-
tation on state or local zoning agency powers would seem to be the 
exception noted in Secretary Boyd's letter of May 24, 1967: that the 
Department would not allow "a State or local authority [to] attempt 
to circumvent the law by zoning an area as 'commercial' for billboard 
purposes only."34 
However, it is not clear whether the Department of Transporta-
tion may ignore such state or local action. The original subsection 
(d) grant of authority to the states "to zone areas for commercial or 
industrial purposes" concludes with an express stipulation that "the 
actions of the States in this regard will be accepted for the purposes 
of this Act." And the sentence, added by the 1968 amendment, that 
authorizes state or local zoning authorities to determine "customary 
use" contains no limitation on their discretion.35 But the first sentence 
of subsection ( d), which contains the basic grant of permission for 
off-premises advertising signs in commercial and industrial areas, does 
31. H.R. 17134, § 6(c), passed by the House, July 3, 1968, in 114 CoNG. REC. 19945 
(1968). 
32. The conference bill appears in 114 CONG. REC. 23692 (1968). As enacted, it was 
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 23 U.S.C.). 
33. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(a), 82 Stat. 817 (codified 
at 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970)). 
34. See text accompanying note 28 supra. 
35. See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
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impose a significant limitation by means of the phrase "consistent 
with the purposes of this section." The congressional purposes are 
generally set forth in subsection (a), which states that outdoor adver-
tising signs in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems 
"should be controlled in order to protect the public investment in 
such highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public 
travel, and to preserve natural beauty." Thus, it can be argued that 
state or local action that zones an area as "commercial" or "industrial" 
solely or primarily to allow location of off-premises advertising signs 
within 660 feet of an interstate or primary federal-aid highway is not 
consistent with the purposes stated in subsection (a), and that the 
Department of Transportation therefore need not accept such action 
as complying with the "effective control" requirement laid down in 
subsection (b). Presumably Secretary Boyd had this in mind when he 
said, in his letter of May 24, 1967, "we know that the Congress does 
not wish for the law to be deliberately evaded by subterfuge."36 The 
current guidelines issued by the Federal Highway Administration 
substantially reiterate the minimum standard laid down in Secretary 
Boyd's letter.37 The Administration's position was recently upheld 
in a significant United States district court case sustaining the Secre-
tary's determination to withhold ten per cent of the federal-aid 
highway funds that would otherwise have been allocated to South 
Dakota for the fiscal year 1973.38 
36. See text accompanying note 28 supra. See also the remarks of Sen. Randolph 
during the debates on the Highway Beautification Act of 1965: "When state or local 
governments act to zone areas for commercial or industrial purposes, in accordance with 
the state's traditional exercise of authority on zoning, these determinations will be 
accepted for purposes of billboard or junkyard control. This language, of course, does 
not mean that a state or local authority could place a label 'zoned commercial or in-
dustrial' on land adjacent to the Interstate and primary systems solely to permit bill-
boards or junkyards and thereby frustrate the intent of Congress stated in section 13l(a)." 
89 CoNc. REc. 26820 (1965). 
37. 23 C.F.R. § 750.305(c) (1973). 
38. South Dakota v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1973). The South Dakota case 
holds that the South Dakota statute, S.D. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 31-29-1 to -60 (1970), is 
not in compliance with title I on several grounds. The case is discussed in note 131 infra 
and accompanying text. 
Since the original Wyoming "compliance" law, ch. 242, [1967] Wyo. Laws 697, zoned 
all agricultural lands outside of municipalities and lying within 660 feet of the edge 
of any interstate or primary highway as "commercial," subject to rezoning by the sev-
eral boards of county commissioners, it is not surprising that the Federal Highway 
Administration did not consider it to be consistent with title I requirements. If the 
Federal Highway Administrator had formally determined to impose the ten per cent 
penalty provided by subsection (b) on Wyoming, Wyoming could have invoked the 
judicial review provisions of subsection (l). But the Administrator never made the neces-
sary decision to withhold funds and the issue was not judicially reviewed prior to the 
repeal of the law by ch. 250, § 16, [1971] Wyo. Laws 568. The current "compliance" 
law is found in WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-110 to -124 (1971). 
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There was, initially, also a bitter controversy over the definition of 
"unzoned commercial and industrial areas." Subsection (d) states 
that such definition is to be made "by agreement between the several 
States and the Secretary." The proposed standards and criteria for 
resolving this question that were transmitted to Congress by the 
Bureau of Public Roads on January IO, 1967,89 were, in effect, aban-
doned when Secretary Boyd sent his letter of May 24, 1967, to Chair-
man K.luczynski of the House Subcommittee on Roads.40 That letter 
said in part: "Concerning unzoned commercial and industrial areas, 
we shall be happy to request the guidance and suggestions of the 
several States with respect to designating these areas. The only 
absolute requirement upon which we would insist would be the 
existence of at least one commercial activity in any such area." As 
far as can be ascertained, this is still the position of the Federal 
Highway Administration,41 and, although many of the state laws in 
their original form did not comply with even this requirement,42 it 
now appears that all but one of the fifty states have statutes that do 
comply with it.48 
39. S. Doc. No. 6, supra note 25, at 46-47. 
40. See text accompanying note 28 supra. 
41. U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Dept. of Transportation, Policy and Pro• 
cedure Memorandum 80-5.2, 11 5(d) (Dec. 12, 1972) [hereinafter Policy and Procedure 
Memorandum 80-5.2), simply states: "[a]ctual industrial or commercial use at any given 
time will determine the classification of unzoned commercial or industrial areas." 
42. See R. CUNNINGHAM, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ADVERTISING SIGNS: SOME LEGAL PROB• 
LEMS 26-27 (Highway Research Board, NCHRP Report No. 119, 1971). 
43. See text accompanying notes 129-31 infra, Opposition to the "absolute require• 
ment" that any area to be defined as an "unzoned commercial or industrial area" must 
have "at least one commercial [or industrial) activity" already in existence in the area 
has been based primarily on tw·o separate but closely related arguments. First, it is 
argued that such a requirement would eliminate about 90 per cent of the existing 
off-premises advertising sigus in rural areas, and that Congress could not have intended 
such a drastic result in view of the introductory clause of subsection (d). Second, it is 
argued that such a drastic elimination of off-premises advertising signs in rural areas is 
not essential to the achievement of the stated scenic purpose of title I ("to preserve 
natural beauty"), since many rural areas that presently have no commercial or industrial 
uses are not naturally beautiful. Hence, it is argued, it would be more consistent with 
congressional intent for the Secretary of Transportation to accept proposals from the 
states for defining as "unzoned commercial and industrial areas" certain rural areas that 
are not naturally beautiful and that would be appropriate for commercial or industrial 
uses although no such uses are presently in existence. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 28, at 102-31; 1967 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 213-29 (statement of R.D. 
Hetrick, President, Roadside Business Association); Hearings on S. 3118 Before the Sub-
comm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2 Sess. 322-30, 
342-45 (1968); Hearings on H.R. 17134 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House 
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 593-98, 610-13 (1968) (statement of Donald 
S. Barbour, member of the Executive Committee, Roadside Business Association); 1969 
Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 61-67, 71-89; Hearings on Highway Legislation Before 
the Subcomm. on Roads of the House Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
146-61 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 House Hearings] (statement of Paul Spooner, General 
Counsel, Roadside Business Association). 
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3. Subsections (e) and (n): Time for Removal of 
"Nonconforminrf' Signs 
Subsection (e) of title I states flatly that 
1307 
[a]ny sign, display, or device lawfully in existence along the Inter-
state System or the Federal-aid primary system on September I, 1965, 
which does not conform to this section shall not be required to be 
removed until July I, 1970. Any other sign, display, or device law-
£ully erected which does not conform to this section shall not be 
required to be removed until the end of the fifth year after it be-
comes nonconforming. 
The House report explains that the purpose of this subsection 
"is to allow the advertising business to amortize, in so far as possible, 
its existing investment in the signboards before they are removed.''44 
The Report also states that the subsection provides a "!5-year period 
before existing signs [made nonconforming by title I] actually will 
have to come down,"45 and that the last sentence is designed to cover 
lawfully existing signs that become nonconforming in the future as 
a result of (I) incorporation of a part of the secondary highway system 
into the primary system and (2) later revision of regulations issued 
at the outset of the advertising control program.46 
The reference in the House report to the five-year grace period as 
designed to allow amortization is puzzling. In zoning law the concept 
of "amortization" has generally been used to allow the owner of a 
nonconforming building or of the situs of any nonconforming use to 
continue the nonconformance for a designated period of time before 
being compelled to discontinue it, without compensation, by an 
application of the police power.47 Since subsection (g) of title I pro-
By the time of the 1969 hearings of the Senate and House Subcommittees on Roads, 
the Roadside Business Association, representing the major commercial interests opposed 
to the Secretary's "absolute requirement" of "at least one commercial activity" as a basis 
for defining "unzoned commercial and industrial areas," was advocating a major revision 
of title I, under which off-premises advertising signs would be excluded only from scenic 
areas, areas zoned for residential use, or other locations designated by state statute or 
local ordinance. The principal effect of such a revision, of course, would be to open up 
all nonscenic rural areas to off-premises advertising. It is conceivable that the Commis-
sion on Highway Beautification, see text accompanying notes 317-24 infra, may recom-
mend a shift to this approach, but it seems unlikely in view of the federal highway 
authorities' recent success in overcoming the resistence of many states to the restrictive 
definition of "unzoned commercial and industrial areas" championed by the former 
Bureau of Public Roads and the present Federal Highway Administration. 
44. 1965 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 5-6. 
47. For a good judicial discussion of the "amortization" concept in connection with 
nonconforming uses under zoning ordinances, see Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 
553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958). 
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vides for the payment of just compensation when nonconforming 
signs are removed, it is hard to see the relevance of the amortization 
concept. It is possible that the House committee had in mind the fact 
that most advertising "leases" initially run for five years. But since 
the value of all periods for which the "lessee" has the option to renew 
must be included in valuing the "leasehold," it is still difficult to 
see the relevance of the five-year period. It is also possible that the 
House committee thought that advertising sign owners, when faced 
with a requirement that all nonconforming signs should ultimately 
be removed, might allow their nonconforming signs to deteriorate 
during the five-year minimum period allowed under subsection (e), 
thus reducing the amount of compensation that would ultimately 
have to be paid.48 But it is hard to see why a sign owner would find it 
advantageous to allow its signs to deteriorate during the grace period, 
since in any case it would be assured of just compensation based on 
their value at the date of removal. And, for reasons which will be 
stated in the next section of this Article,49 it does not seem that the 
Committee intended that partial, or even full, amortization of the 
sign owners' interests might be accomplished so that full payment 
would become unnecessary. It seems probable, therefore, that the 
five-year grace period was provided to allow the states a reasonable 
time in which to adopt compliance laws, make inventories of con-
forming and nonconforming signs, enact desired zoning regulations 
for industrial and commercial areas, negotiate necessary agreements 
with the federal authorities, set up plans for the orderly removal of 
nonconforming signs, and actually carry out the removal. The adop-
tion in 1968 of subsection (n), which provides that no removal shall 
be required under title I until the federal compensation funds are 
available, 50 further extended the time, since substantial federal fund-
ing of the removal program was delayed until fiscal 1970.51 The 
Federal Highway Administration now estimates that, at the 1973 
48. For a discussion favoring this theory, see Lamm &: Yasinow, The Highway Beau-
tification Act of 1965: A Case Study in Legislative Frustration, 46 DENVER L.J. 437, 444-45 
(1969). 
49. See text accompanying notes 53-114 infra. 
50. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(d), 82 Stat. 817 (codified 
at 23 U.S.C. § 13l(n) (1970)). 
51. See 23 U.S.C. § 13l(m) (1970), which now provides: 
There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this section, 
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed 
$20,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, not to exceed S20,000,000 for 
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, not to exceed $20,000,000 for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1970, not to exceed $27,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1971, not to exceed $20,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and not to 
exceed $50,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973. 
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fiscal year funding level, the sign removal program, nationwide, will 
take five to six years.52 
Although it may be largely academic in view of the understand-
able reluctance of most states to proceed with compensated removal 
of nonconforming signs before funding of the seventy-five per cent 
federal share, it seems clear that the states remain free, under sub-
section (k) of title I, to require removal of nonconforming signs 
within a shorter period than is required by subsections (e) and (n). 
Neither subsection (e) nor subsection (n) was intended to give sign 
owners a federal right to maintain nonconforming signs for the 
maximum period allowable under these provisions if a state wishes 
to require earlier removal and can satisfy the just compensation re-
quirements of subsection (g). Both subsection (e) and subsection (n) 
were merely intended to make it clear that no state need require re-
moval of nonconforming signs prior to the times specified therein in 
order to avoid the ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b). 
4. Subsection (g): "Just Compensation" upon Removal 
of Advertising Signs 
It seems reasonably clear that a state must provide for the pay-
ment of just compensation upon the removal of outdoor advertising 
signs if it is to avoid the ten per cent penalty, although this point will 
not be conclusively established until it has been determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The point was sufficiently trou-
blesome that, in 1966, the Secretary of Commerce sought an opinion 
from the U.S. Attorney General on (a) whether title I may be read 
as granting to the states the option of using their police power to 
52. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-5.2, supra note 41, ,r IO(c), which also 
recommends the following order of priority in removal: 
(I) Illegal and abandoned signs. 
(2) Hardship situations. 
(3) Minimum value signs. 
(4) Signs in areas which have been designated as scenic under authority of State law. 
(5) Product advertising on: 
(a) Rural interstate highway. 
(b) On rural primary highway. 
(c) Urban areas. 
(6) Nontourist-oricnted directional advertising. 
(7) Tourist-oriented directional advertising. 
These arc only recommended priorities; selection and programming of sign removal 
projects is the responsibility of the states. 23 C.F.R. § 750.310(c) (1973). The general pro-
vision authorizing removal projects is 23 C.F.R. § 750.310(a) (1973): 
A sign removal project may consist of any group of proposed sign removals selected 
in a reasonable fashion. The signs may be those belonging to one company of those 
located along a single route, all of the signs in a single county or other locality, or 
any other similar grouping. Generally speaking, a single project should not include 
signs along both Interstate and Primary highways unless the number of signs along 
one system is so small that it would be more logical to include these in the project 
than on the other system. 
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remove outdoor advertising signs, without payment of compensation, 
and without incurring the ten per cent penalty; and (b) whether, if 
title I is construed as foreclosing such an option, the Congressional 
requirement that just compensation be paid upon removal of outdoor 
advertising signs is invalid as applied to a state where the removal 
can constitutionally be effected under the police power. 
Ramsey Clark, then Acting Attorney General, in an opinion is-
sued November 16, 1966,53 concluded (a) that title I must be read as 
requiring each state to afford just compensation upon removal of out-
door advertising signs as a condition of avoiding the ten per cent 
penalty and (b) that there is no basis for concluding that this require-
ment is unconstitutional as to any state. 
Clark's opinion points out, with respect to the first question, that 
title I does not by express language either require or forbid the appli-
cation of the ten per cent penalty in the event of an election by a state 
to rely upon its police power in removing outdoor advertising signs. 
But the intent of Congress that the penalty should be applied if the 
state so elects is reasonably inferrable from the language of the Act 
and the legislative history of title I.54 Subsection (c) defines "effective 
control" to mean that, after January l, 1968, advertising signs "shall, 
pursuant to this section, be limited to" 55 specified types. The itali-
cized words may reasonably be interpreted to require that, where the 
control of signs requires removals, the standard of effective control 
has not been met unless just compensation has been paid in accor-
dance with subsection (g). Moreover, title IV of the Highway Beautifi-
cation Act includes section 401, which, although it is poorly drafted, 
clearly indicates the intent of the Congress to assure, so far as possible, 
that just compensation should be paid whenever lawfully existing 
advertising signs are "taken" or an existing and reasonable use of land 
for advertising purposes is "restricted."56 
Even if the language referred to in the preceding paragraphs is 
not deemed sufficiently clear to establish the congressional intent to 
require compensation, the legislative history of the Highway Beautifi-
cation Act removes all reasonable doubt. The Administration-spon-
sored bill, B. 2084, which originated title I, did not require compen-
sation. It originally contained the following subsection: 
53. 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26 (1966). 
54. Id. at 2-5. 
55. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (1970) (emphasis added). 
56. See Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-285, tit. IV, § 401, 79 
Stat. 1033: "Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed 
to authorize private property to be taken or the reasonable and existing use restricted 
by such taking without just compensation as provided in this Act." 
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(g) Whenever a State shall submit evidence satisfactory to the 
Secretary that it is unable to secure effective control, as herein pro-
vided, under its police powers, Federal-aid funds may be used to pay 
the Federal pro rata share of the costs of providing effective control 
by purchase or condemnation.57 
It is apparent from the hearings that this provision was quite unsatis-
factory to the members of both the House and the Senate commit-
tees. 58 The Senate Committee on Public Works rewrote it to include 
a flat provision for the payment of just compensation upon removal 
of outdoor advertising signs and explained that action as follows: 
This section, as originally proposed, would have required the 
States, wherever the authority exists, to exercise their police power 
in acquiring advertising rights. The committee emphatically and 
unanimously rejects the use of police power in acquiring these rights, 
and has provided for the use of Federal funds for paying the Federal 
pro rata share of the acquisition costs of such rights through purchase 
or condemnation. Such payment is mandatory, not permissive, on 
the States.59 
Similar remarks appear in the report of the House Committee on 
Public Works.00 It is thus clear that the revision of the bill to provide 
for payment of just compensation to those who suffered loss as a re-
sult of removal of outdoor advertising signs was intended by the Sen-
ate and House committees to leave no room for a penalty-free election 
by any state to rely upon its police power and avoid payment of com-
pensation. 
It is also clear from the floor debates that the "mandatory" char-
acter of the just compensation provision was understood by the mem-
bers of Congress. For example, in response to a question as to what 
would happen if a state decided not to pay its twenty-five per cent 
share of the just compensation, Senator Randolph, Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Public Works and floor manager of S. 2084, 
stated that ten per cent of the state's federal-aid highway funds would 
be withheld until the state complied.61 And section 401 was added to 
57. S. 2084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. I, § IOI(g) (1965). 
58. See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 43, 69-72, 98, 226, 278-81, 
286-87; 1965 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 22-24, 39-41, 43-51, 107-08, 207-08, 250-52, 
391. 
59. 1965 SENA.TE REPORT, supra note 20, at 7. 
60. 1965 HouSE REPoRT, supra note 7, at 71. 
61. lll CoNG, R.Ec. 23874 (1965). See also discussion of "compensation" in lll CONG. 
R.Ec. 23869 (Sen. Randolph), 23872 (Sen. Cooper and Sen. Muskie), 23875 (Sen. Randolph), 
23880 (Sen. Randolph), 23883 (Sen. Cooper and Sen. Randolph), 23887-88 (Sen. Fong), 
24126 (Sen. Dirksen and Sen. Randolph), 23134 (Sen. Allott), 26259 (Rep. Karth: "[i]f the 
States do not pay the 25 percent they will be subject to a loss of money'), 26261 (Rep. 
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the Highway Beautification Act on the floor of the Senate at the insis-
tence of the late Senator Dirksen for the express purpose of making it 
absolutely clear that it was the congressional policy to encourage the 
payment of compensation rather than to authorize the states to rely 
on their police power to implement titles I and II.62 
Even if the only clues to congressional intent in enacting subsec-
tion (g) of title I were the subcommittee hearings, the Committee re-
ports, and the floor debates with regard to the original Act, I would 
conclude that the Attorney General's opinion is correct in stating that 
"in order to receive a full allocation of highway funds, a State must 
provide compensation in accordance with section 13l(g) even though 
it is in a position to accomplish the required removals of billboards 
by other means." 63 But title I has been the subject of subcommittee 
consideration every year from 1967 through 1969, and there were ex-
tensive floor debates in both the Senate and House before enactment 
of the 1968 amendments to title I. Without exception, these hearings 
and floor debates reinforce the conclusion that Congress intended to 
require the payment of compensation upon removal of advertising 
signs as a condition of avoiding the ten per cent penalty.64 
In light of the legislative history and subsequent congressional 
treatment of the just compensation requirement of subsection (g), I 
find quite unpersuasive the argument of Lamm and Yasinow that 
Congress did not really intend by that subsection to require full com-
pensation for the value of sign owners' and landowners' interests 
when nonconforming signs were removed, but rather "thought that 
partial or even full amortization of both sign owner and property 
Kluczynski), 26262 (Rep. Edmondson), 26272 (Rep. Wright), 26274 (Rep. Blatnik), 26281-
82 (Rep. Pelly), 26318 (colloquy on "compensation") (1965). 
62. For the text of section 401, see note 56 supra. When Senator Dirksen originally 
proposed the amendment that became section 401, he said: "[T]his is a restatement of 
the principles laid down in article V of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution." In re-
sponse, Senator Randolph said, "I believe that the just compensation features of the 
Senate bill 2084 are clear and conclusive on this point; but it is a restatement, and I 
agree, and join the Senator from Illinois in accepting the amendment." Ill CONG. R.Ec. 
24126 (1965). Before final passage, the amendment as offered by Senator Dirksen was 
slightly altered by a substitute proposed by Senator Randolph. Ill CONG. R.Ec. 24189 
(1965). 
63. 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26, at 4-5 (1965). 
64. See, e.g., 1969 House Hearings, supra note 43, at 155. Paul Spooner, General 
Counsel, Roadside Business Association, stated he had been informed that the Federal 
Highway Administration had informed at least one State "that the just compensation 
provisions of the Federal act are not really binding and that there are ways to evade it." 
In response, Rep. Cramer said, "We very clearly stated ••• that when signs are removed 
there is to be just compensation. I do not think there is any doubt in the mind of any 
member of this committee that that was the intention and purpose and the only fair 
way to require the removal of signs." 
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owner interests could be accomplished during [the 5-year grace period 
allowed under subsection (e)], thus making 'compensation' as de-
scribed in the act partially or totally unnecessary."65 It may well be, as 
Lamm and Yasinow assert, that "[m]any people .... assumed that 
the use of the state police power to impose billboard control restric-
tions, which were the same or greater than those imposed by the fed-
eral statute, would continue to be available and would not impose an 
obligation to 'justly compensate' upon either Federal or state Govern-
ment," and that "[£]or these people the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral declaring that a state risked losing its Federal-Aid Highway funds 
if it did not provide 'just compensation' came as no small shock.''66 
But this assumption, and the shock that ensued when the Attorney 
General's opinion was issued, were primarily due to a failure to read 
carefully the legislative history of title I, subsection (g) of the 1965 
Act. That the state highway agencies have generally accepted the At-
torney General's opinion on this point is evidenced by the fact that 
no state has challenged his interpretation, either in an action under 
subsection ('l) contesting a determination to withhold funds or in a 
declaratory judgment action under the judical review provisions of 
the federal Administrative Procedure Act67 to determine whether it 
conflicts with the tenth amendment. 
It should be emphasized that Congress, in including the just com-
pensation requirement in title I, intended to do more than simply 
affirm state and federal constitutional guarantees of just compensa-
tion when private property is taken for public use.68 If that were all 
that subsection (g) was intended to do, any state that can constitu-
tionally use its police power to effect the removal of highway adver-
tising signs would be free of the federal compensation requirement, 
because in such a case there would be no "taking" of private property 
in the constitutional sense. But Congress intended virtually to rule 
out use of state police power and to require the states, when highway 
65. Lamm & Yasinow, supra note 48, at 444. 
66. Id. at 443. 
67. 5 u.s.c. §§ 701-06 (1970). 
68. Section 401 of the Highway Beautification Act, set out in note 56 supra, is not 
very helpful, but on the whole I believe it supports the position stated in the text. It is 
clear that section 401 was added during consideration of the Act on the floor of the 
Senate simply to satisfy the late Senator Dirksen. I do not believe much weight should 
be given to Senator Dirksen's statement that "this is a restatement of the principles laid 
down in article V of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution." 111 CONG. R.Ec. 24126 
(1965). See note 62 supra. Certainly it does not indicate that Senator Dirksen favored the 
use of the police power in any state where state and federal constitutions permit the 
removal of nonconforming signs without compensation. Indeed, it is likely that Senator 
Dirksen interpreted the due process clause of the United States Constitution to require 
payment of compensation upon removal of any lawfully erected nonconforming sign. 
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advertising signs are removed, either to pay the sign owners and land-
owners affected by the removal just compensation determined by mu-
tual agreement or to utilize their power of eminent domain. I£ a 
state uses its power of eminent domain, "just compensation" must, of 
course, be determined by the state courts in accordance with their 
usual rules in eminent domain cases. 
The legislative history of title I includes many instances in which 
proponents of the legislation stated that subsection (g) makes the pay-
ment of just compensation upon removal of highway advertising signs 
"mandatory."69 Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether 
subsection (g) was intended to create an absolute federal right to com-
pensation on the part of the affected sign owners and landowners, 
even if a state might prefer to use its police power to bring about re-
moval of highway advertising signs and run the risk of incurring the 
ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b). 
This issue was in fact raised and decided in Markham Advertising 
Co. v. State,70 although in a strict sense what the court said with re-
spect to it was only a dictum. In the Markham case a large group of 
outdoor advertising companies challenged the constitutionality of the 
Washington Highway Advertising Control Act of 196171 on various 
grounds. The Washington statute provided for the regulation of out-
door advertising in line with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958.72 
The Washington statute, inter alia, prohibited all off-premises adver-
tising signs within designated scenic areas, and in certain other areas 
permitted off-premises advertising signs only within twelve miles of 
the activity advertised.73 The statute specifically declared it unlawful 
to maintain after March 11, 1964, or, in areas zoned for commercial 
or industrial use, after March 11, 1965, any signs erected prior to 
69. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra. See also S. REP. No. 542, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 10 (1967) (the Senate Committee "reaffirmed its belief that mandatory compensa-
tion was necessary as a matter of simple justice"); H.R. REP. No. 713, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5 (1967): 
The committee believes that a clear statement of Congressional intent, as expressed 
in the law, is called for. 
Section 13l(g) and section 136G) ••• clearly and unequivocally require that just 
compensation shall be paid •••• 
Other alternative methods of handling the compensation requirement ••• were 
considered and rejected •••• The language of the law is explicit, and it is not really 
susceptible of misinterpretation. "Just compensation shall be paid • • •" is what the 
law says, and that is what it means. 
70. 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969). 
71. Ch. 96, [1961) Wash. Laws 1575, WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.010-.910 (1961), as 
amended, WASH, REv. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.020-.911 (Supp. 1972). 
72. Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89. 
73. WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.040 (Supp. 1972). 
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March II, 1961, that did not comply with the statute and regulations 
issued thereunder.74 
All the nonconforming signs owned by the plaintiffs and involved 
in the Markham case were lawfully erected prior to March II, 1961,75 
and became unlawful, at the latest, on March II, 1965.76 Thus, the 
just compensation requirement of subsection (g) of title I of the High-
way Beautification Act was inapplicable, since the signs in question 
were not "lawfully in existence" on October 22, 1965, the date of the 
enactment of that Act. Notwithstanding this obvious fact,77 however, 
the plaintiffs in the ]Markham case argued that the just compensation 
requirement under subsection (g) is absolutely mandatory-that Con-
gress intended thereby "to displace contrary or inconsistent provisions 
in the laws of this state [Washington], and in that respect has pre-
empted, under the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, this 
field of legislation" -and hence that the signs in question could not 
be removed under the Washington statute without payment of just 
compensation therefor.78 Both the trial court and the Supreme Court 
of Washington dealt with this argument on the merits, apparently 
overlooking the fact that, even if the argument were accepted, subsec-
tion (g) had no application to the signs of the plaintiffs. 
The trial court rejected the argument that Congress had pre-
empted the field by imposing an absolutely mandatory requirement 
of just compensation upon removal of advertising signs: "In passing 
the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 ... Congress did not intend 
to pre-empt the subject of highway advertising control. Rather, Con-
gress intended to encourage the states to control highway advertising 
74. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 47.42.100(1) (Supp. 1972). The original act required re-
moval of all signs by March II, 1964, ch. 96, § 10(1), [1961] Wash. Laws 1579, but a 1963 
amendment extended the grace period to March II, 1965, for nonconforming signs lo-
cated in areas zoned for commercial or industrial use within any city or town. Ch. 3, 
§ 55(l), [1963] Wash. Laws Extraordinary Sess. 1323. 
75. 73 Wash. 2d at 414, 439 P .2d at 254. 
76. WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 47.42.080 (Supp. 1972) expressly declares that "[a]ny 
sign erected or maintained contrary to the provisions of this chapter or regulations 
promulgated hereunder ••• shall be a public nuisance" subject to removal on fifteen 
days' notice to the "permittee" or the owner of the land on which the sign is located. 
77. This point was completely missed by counsel for the advertising companies, who 
asserted in their brief that "virtually all of appellants' signs involved in this case were 
'lawfully in e.xistence' on October 22, 1965, by virtue of permits from the State Highway 
Commission." Brief for Appellants at 22-23. In fact, the Highway Commission had or-
dered appellants to remove their nonconforming signs because their "amortization" 
periods of either three or four years had all expired. If the use of the police power to 
require removal was othenvise valid, it is clear that none of the signs involved in the 
suit were "lawfully in existence" on October 22, 1965. 
78. Brief for Appellants at 22-25; Appellants' Petition for Rehearing at 2-8, apps. 
A, B &: C. 
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by making it financially advantageous for a state to do so."79 When 
the plaintiffs urged the same argument on appeal, the Washington 
Supreme Court also rejected it.80 In a petition for rehearing before 
the supreme court, the appellants repeated the argument.81 The 
petition was denied.82 
The plantiffs' appeal to the United States Supreme Court was 
dismissed per curiam "for want of a substantial federal question";83 
a subsequent petition for rehearing was also denied.84 Unfortunately, 
a per curiam dismissal of an appeal "for want of a substantial federal 
question" is not the equivalent of a decision upholding a challenged 
state statute on the merits. But even though the issue has not yet been 
conclusively decided, it is reasonably clear that the Washington Su-
preme Court's interpretation of subsection (g) of title I of the High-
way Beautification Act is correct. 
Subsection (g) must, of course, be read in context, as part of the 
Highway Beautification Act as a whole, and as part of chapter I of 
title 23 of the United States Code. All of the provisions of chapter I 
of title 23 define the position of the federal government as passive, ex-
cept that it is to supply, and to specify conditions for the use of, funds 
for the states to use for highway purposes. Under this chapter the fed-
eral government builds no highways; that has historically been a re-
sponsibility of the states. All the provisions of chapter I of title 23, in-
cluding section 131 as a whole (title I of the Highway Beautification 
Act) and subsection (g) thereof, are a part of that web of specifications 
and conditions; the only inducement for the states to comply is the 
grant of federal funds. The Highway Beautification Act, clearly based 
on the same premise as the earlier provisions of chapter I, title 23 of 
the United States Code, utilizes both the whip and the carrot to in-
duce the states to build and maintain interstate and primary high-
ways in accordance with certain federal conditions. Both title I and 
title II (dealing with control of highway junkyards) of the Highway 
Beautification Act use the whip-a ten per cent penalty-while title 
III (dealing with landscaping and scenic enhancement) uses the car-
rot-a three per cent bonus. To single out subsection (g) of title I 
and argue that it proceeds on an entirely different premise is absurd. 
79. 73 Wash. 2d at 417,439 P.2d at 256. Accord, Southeastern Displays, Inc. v. Ward, 
414 S.W .2d 573 (Ky. 1967). 
80. 73 Wash. 2d at 419,439 P.2d at 257. 
81. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing at 2-8, apps. A, B, &: C. 
82. 73 Wash. 2d at 433, 439 P.2d at 257. 
83. 393 U.S. 316 (1969). 
84. 393 U.S. 1112 (1969). 
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Title I of the Highway Beautification Act deals with only one as-
pect of the federal program of grants-in-aid for highway construction 
and merely imposes certain conditions as a prerequisite to a state's re-
ceiving its full allocation of federal funds. There is no suggestion any-
where in the language of title I that Congress intended to impose any 
absolute, mandatory requirements with respect to highway beautifica-
tion by virtue of its power to regulate interstate commerce. The use 
of the word "shall" in subsection (g) certainly cannot be read as im-
posing such a requirement. The word "shall" occurs throughout chap-
ter 1 of title 23 of the United States Code, but provisions containing 
the word are mandatory only if the state wants to obtain a certain 
share of the federal-aid highway funds. This has been the universal 
interpretation and uniform theory of administrative practice under 
the federal-aid highway laws since their inception in 1916. Similarly, 
as we have already seen,85 the phrase "shall not be required to be re-
moved" in subsection (e) of the same title of the Highway Beautifica-
tion Act does not prohibit removal of nonconforming signs by the 
states in less than the stated period of time but merely indicates that 
no state is required to remove such signs in less than such period in 
order to avoid the ten per cent penalty imposed under subsection (b). 
All of the subcomittee hearings in 1965 proceeded on the assump-
tion that the title I requirements were mandatory on the states only 
in the sense that the states must comply with them in order to avoid 
the ten per cent penalty. There is nothing in the hearings to indicate 
that the subcommittee members intended to forbid absolutely the 
use of any state's police power to eliminate highway advertising signs, 
although it was clearly assumed that few, if any, states would be will-
ing to suffer the ten per cent penalty in order to avoid payment of 
just compensation to sign owners and landowners. Consequently, the 
statement in the Senate committee report that "[s]uch payment is 
mandatory, not permissive, on the States"86 and the statement in the 
House committee report that "compensation must be paid to those 
individuals who will lose their signs"87 must both be read as meaning 
that payment of just compensation is mandatory if, and only if, a state 
wishes to receive its full share of federal funds. 
The floor debates proceeded on the same assumption as the sub-
committee hearings.88 The amendment on the floor that added sec-
85. See text following note 52 supra. 
86. See text accompanying note 59 supra. 
87. 1965 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. 
88. See te.xt accompanying note 61 supra. 
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tion 401 to the Highway Beautification Act89 can be considered an 
admonition to the states not to take property unconstitutionally in the 
course of implementing the Act, but it cannot reasonably be read as 
imposing on them an absolute duty to compensate in the absence of a 
con~titutional requirement. 
As previously suggested,90 subsection (g) does not require the 
states to pay just compensation upon removal of advertising signs 
that were already unlawful on the date of the enactment of title I, 
whether the signs were unlawful because they were erected in violation 
of an existing state law or local ordinance or because they were main-
tained after the date set for removal by a valid state law or local ordi-
nance enacted under the state's police power. Subsection (g) only di-
rects that "just compensation shall be paid upon the removal of" 
advertising signs either (I) lawfully in existence on October 22, 
1965,91 or (2) lawfully on any highway made a part of the interstate 
or primary system between October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968, or 
(3) lawfully erected on or after January I, 1968. Category (I) is de-
signed to include signs lawfully in existence along interstate or pri-
mary highways on October 22, 1965, that became nonconforming as a 
result of the enactment of title I. Category (2) is designed to include 
signs lawfully erected along federal-aid secondary or other highways 
that became nonconforming when the highways were incorporated 
into the interstate or primary systems during the period between Oc-
tober 22, 1965, and January I, 1968. Category (3) includes all signs 
lawfully erected on or after January I, 1968, that later became non-
conforming for whatever reason. 
Even assuming that just compensation is clearly required in a 
given case by subsection (g), how is the amount of compensation to be 
determined? Subsection (g) provides that compensation shall be paid 
for the following: 
(A) The taking from the owner of such sign, display, or device of 
all right, title, leasehold, and interest in such sign, display, or device; 
and 
(B) The taking from the owner of the real property on which the 
sign, display, or device is located, of the right to erect and maintain 
such signs, displays, and devices thereon. 
89. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. 
90. See text accompanying notes 70-84 supra. 
91. Note the discrepancy between subsection (e) with its cut-off date of September 1, 
1965, and subsection (g) with its cut-off date of October 22, 1965. This discrepancy ap-
pears to be inadvertent. 
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This provision, unfortunately, is perhaps the most ambiguous of 
many ambiguous provisions in title I of the Highway Beautification 
Act. Only one thing is really clear: Congress intended that com-
pensation should be paid to both the sign owner and the landowner in 
the usual case where the sign itself is not owned by the owner of the 
land on which it is located and that, where one person owns both the 
sign and the land, he is to receive all the compensation. 
,vith respect to the interests of both the sign mvner and the land-
owner, it seems clear that any amount of compensation agreed upon 
and accepted will satisfy the subsection (g) requirement of just com-
pensation. 92 But the agreed compensation will normally approximate 
what the parties believe the sign owner and the landowner would re-
ceive in an eminent domain proceeding. Eminent domain proceed-
ings themselves will probably have to be used in at least some caseg, 
because the state will be unable to reach an agreement on compensa-
tion with the sign mvner, the landmvner, or both. Consequently, it is 
necessary to try to ascertain what property interests are to be paid for 
under subsection (g). 
Subsection (g) says, first, that the sign owner is to be compensated 
for the "taking ... of all right, title, leasehold, and interest in" his 
signs. The reference to the sign owner's "leasehold" in the sign is con-
fusing, since ownership implies an absolute property interest rather 
than simply a leasehold. Probably the draftsman intended to require 
compensation for the taking of the sign owner's "leasehold" in the 
land in those cases where the sign is erected pursuant to a lease on 
land not owned by the mvner of the sign. Presumably the reference to 
a "leasehold" will be so construed, despite the defective draftsman-
ship. 93 It should be noted, however, that the so-called "leasehold" of 
the sign mvner is usually not really a leasehold estate carrying with it 
an exclusive right to possession of a defined area for a term of years. 
Instead, it commonly is some sort of easement or license.94 Since 
"leases" that authorize the maintenance of signs on vacant land usu-
ally purport to lease "as much of the premises ... as may be necessary 
for the construction of advertising structures or displays and supports 
92. The criteria of the former Bureau of Public Roads for federal participation may 
not, of course, allow full payment of 75 per cent of the amount agreed upon. 
See U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, Dept. of Commerce, Policy and Procedure Memoran-
dum 80-9, 1J 5 (March 31, 1967) [hereinafter Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9). 
93. The California compliance law uses language based on the suggested construc-
tion. See text accompanying note 191 infra. 
94. I .AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.4, at 184-85 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Accord, 
Wilson, Billboards and the Right To Be Seen from the Highway, 30 GEo. L.J. 723, 745-47 
(1942). 
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therefor,"95 without designating very precisely where within the tract 
leased such structures are to be erected, and allow the lessor to use 
the land for any purpose that will not interfere with its use for adver-
tising purposes, it seems clear that such an arrangement really creates 
an "easement for a term of years" rather than a true leasehold estate. 
Some cases describe the interest created as a "license," but a license 
by definition is revocable at the will of the landowner. Whenever the 
advertising lease is for a definite term and indicates the intent of the 
parties that it should not be revocable at the landowner's will, it 
should be deemed to create an easement rather than a license.96 
What about the sign o-wner's interest in the sign itself? When an 
advertising sign is "annexed" to the land or to a building on the land 
by the landowner himself, it seems clearly to meet the test of a "fix-
ture," and thus to be real property, under either the strict English 
rule97 or the American rule as stated in Teaff v. Hewitt.98 But most 
95. This wording is from standard lease forms used by Central Advertising Company 
of Michigan. Other outdoor advertising companies use lease forms with slightly different 
language, but the substance is generally similar. 
96. Sometimes the instrument gives the outdoor advertising company the right to use 
the land for advertising purposes for a short term, subject to the landowner's power to 
terminate the company's rights on 30 days' notice in the event the property is sold, leased 
for anything other than advertising use, or desired for building construction. Even such 
an instrument--often termed a "letter of permission" rather than a "lease"-seems to 
create an easement rather than a mere license, although the easement is subject to a 
power of termination upon the occurrence of specified events. In some states, certain 
rural advertising signs have been erected on the basis of a mere revocable permission or 
license, but my understanding is that such licenses have generally been replaced by leases 
creating easements since enactment of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965. 
Whether the easement created by an advertising lease should be classified as an 
"easement appurtenant" or an "easement in gross" is a more difficult question. In the 
case of an off-premise advertising sign maintained by a roadside business establishment, 
it can reasonably be argued that the easement created by the advertising lease is appur-
tenant to the property where the business is conducted. But it is more difficult to regard 
the advertising plant of a standardized outdoor advertising company as a dominant tene-
ment to which the easement created by an advertising lease is appurtenant-especially 
since the plant consists largely of the very advertising structures that are erected and 
maintained at various locations by virtue of the company's advertising leases. On the 
whole, it would seem that the easement created by a lease to a standardized outdoor 
advertising company is an easement in gross rather than an easement appurtenant. See, 
e.g., Whitmier &: Ferris Co., Inc. v. State, 12 App. Div. 2d 165, 166, 209 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 
(1961); Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. Smithers, 224 App. Div. 435, 436, 231 N.Y.S. 
315, 318 (1928); Borough Bill Posting Co. v. Levy, 144 App. Div. 784, 789, 129 N.Y.S. 7'10, 
743 (1911); Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 99, 102, 213 N.Y.S.2d 
812, 815 (Ct. Cl. 1961). The same conclusion is reached in Wilson, supra note 94, at 74. 
It is entirely possible, however, that some courts may classify these as easements appur-
tenant in response to the claims of the outdoor advertising companies for severance 
damages. 
97. The English rule requires attachment or affixation to the land, See 5 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY§ 19.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
98. The court in Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 530 (1853), defined a fixture as 
possessing the following characteristics: 
1st. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto. 
2d. Appropriation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty with which it 
is connected. 
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advertising signs are erected on land owned by someone other than 
the owner of the sign, pursuant to an advertising lease. In this situa-
tion of divided ownership, the American rule may create difficulties. 
In the English common law, an exception to the rule that fixtures 
become part of the realty and cannot be removed was made in the case 
of tenants' "trade fixtures," which-although they were held to be-
long to the landlord while in place-could be removed by the tenant 
at or before the end of his tenancy.99 In the United States, most courts 
have liberalized the English "trade fixture" doctrine substantially.100 
However, in the process American courts have had great difficulty in 
dealing with the question of whether fixtures that are removable by 
a tenant are real or personal property while they are in place. Courts 
have generally refrained from laying down a rigid rule for determin-
ing their character in all situations,101 but frequently, when their 
precise legal character is not really in question, courts speak of remov-
able fixtures as personalty, apparently thinking that this legal status 
necessarily follows from the fact that the tenant can remove them.102 
Strictly speaking, however, it would seem that removable tenant fix-
tures, like other fixtures, are part of the realty until removed, with the 
tenant's right of removal existing apart from, and independently of, 
his unquestioned right to remove any personal chattel that, although 
it is on the land, has not become a part of the realty for any pur-
pose.103 The view that removable tenant fixtures are personal prop-
erty while in place is certainly inconsistent ·with the generally ac-
cepted rule that the tenant loses his right to remove fixtures, but not 
mere personal chattels, if he fails to remove them from the leased 
premises at or before the end of the lease term.104 
In practice, most courts recognize that removable tenant fixtures 
are on the dividing line, in the "twilight zone" between real and per-
sonal property.106 However, the view that a removable tenant fixture 
3d. The intention of the party making the anne.'\:ation, to make the article a 
permanent accession to the freehold-this intention being inferred from the nature 
of the article affi.'\:ed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, 
the structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which the an• 
ne.'\:ation has been made. 
(Emphasis original.) See generally 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 19.3 (A.J. Casner ed. 
1952). 
99. See 5 AMERICAN L\W OF PROPERTY § 19.2, at 11-14 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
100. Id. § 19.11, at 41-42. See generally 36A C.J.S. Fixtures §§ 33-42 (1961). 
101. See, e.g., Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728, 88 S.W.2d 969 (1935). 
102. See, e.g., cases cited in 36A C.J.S. Fixtures § 37, at 686 n.48 (1961). 
103. See, e.g., cases cited in id. § 37, at 686 n.50. 
104. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.11, at 43-44 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 
36A C.J.S. Fixtures § 41, at 693-94 (1961). 
105. See, e.g., Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659 (1931). See also 5 AMERI• 
CAN L\W OF PROPERTY § 19.11, at 42-43 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). 
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is realty has generally been applied in connection with the taking of 
land for public use, so that the condemnor must pay for the fixtures 
as part of the realty but the compensation will go to the tenant be-
cause of his right of removal.106 Even if a removable tenant fixture is 
considered as personalty between the landmvner and the tenant, the 
courts almost uniformly take the position that this rule is entirely for 
the protection of the tenant and cannot be invoked by the con-
demnor. As Nichols says, "[i]f the fixtures are attached to the real 
estate, they must be treated as real estate in determining the total 
award, but in apportioning the award they are treated as personal 
property and credited to the tenant."107 The Uniform Relocation 
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 now 
makes this rule binding on the states "to the greatest extent prac-
ticable under State law.''107a Thus, if signs erected pursuant to an 
advertising lease are classified as removable tenant fixtures, as they 
will be in most jurisdictions, a state highway agency taking such signs 
pursuant to an advertising control statute would generally be com-
pelled to pay for them as part of the realty.108 
Suppose, however, that in a particular state it is determined that 
an advertising sign is personalty rather than realty. In that case, after 
the sign owner's leasehold in the land on which the sign is located has 
been taken by the state, it may require him to remove the sign at his 
106. This rule-stated in 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT Do:MAIN §§ 5.81[2], 5.83 (rev. 3d ed. 
J. Sackman 1970); 4 id. § 13.12 (1971)-is supported by many cases. See, e.g., United States 
v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965); Carmichal v. United States, 273 F.2d 
392 (5th Cir. 1960); Gilbert v. State, 85 Ariz. 321, 338 P.2d 787 (1959); City of Los Angeles 
v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 731, 262 P. 737 (1927); Roffman v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 
179 A.2d 99 (Del. 1962); Bales v. Wichita M.V.R.R., 92 Kan. 771, 141 P. 1009 (1914); 
Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & P.R.R., 209 Mass. 298, 95 N.E. 887 (1911); 
Sheehan v. City of Fall River, 187 Mass. 356, 73 N.E. 544 (1905); State v. Peterson, 134 
Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617 (1958); Poillon v. Gerry, 179 N.Y. 14, 71 N.E. 262 (1904); In re 
City of New York, 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931); Consolidated Ice Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 224 Pa. 487, 73 A. 937 (1909); North Coast R.R. v. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 
115 P. 97 (1911). 
107. 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 106, § 5.81[2], at 5-414. 
107a. Pub. L. No. 91-646, § 305(1), 84 Stat. 1906 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4655(1) 
(1970)). 
108. City of Buffalo v. Michael, 16 N.Y.2d 88, 92, 209 N.E.2d 776, 777, 262 N.Y.S.2d 
441, 442-43 (1965); Whitmier & Ferris Co. v. State, 12 App. Div. 165, 167, 209 N.Y.S.2d 
247, 249 (1961); Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 99, 103, 213 
N.Y.S.2d 812,816 (Ct. CI. 1961), affd. mem., 11 N.Y.2d 1036, 230 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1962); Stein 
Brewery Co. v. State, 200 Misc. 424,426, 103 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (Ct. Cl. 1951). Some of the 
state advertising control laws expressly provide that advertising signs shall be deemed 
to be trade fixtures. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-ll-6(C)(I) (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 69, § 1280(b) (Supp. 1972). In a few states, however, the very existence of 
the right of removal is a proper basis for the denial of compensation to the lessee for 
the value of improvements in their unsevered condition. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore 
v. Gamse, 132 Md. 290, 104 A. 429 (1918). 
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own expense by virtue of the police power.109 Would this be incon-
sistent with the just compensation requirement of subsection (g) on 
the ground that subsection (g) requires either that the "title" of the 
sign owner to the sign be taken and paid for before the sign is re-
moved, or that, if the sign owner does retain his title, he be com-
pensated for the cost of any removal that he is required to perform 
himself? The language of subsection (g) provides no clear answer to 
this problem, but I think it likely that the subsection will be held to 
require compensation of the sign owner for his interest in the sign on 
one basis or the other, even though it would be both constitutional 
and in accord with state law to require removal of the sign without 
further compensation once the sign owner's leasehold has been 
taken.110 In any case, the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real 
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 now requires state highway 
agencies to pay for "actual reasonable expenses in moving ... per-
sonal property" or "actual direct losses of tangible personal property 
as a result of moving ... a business ... operation" pursuant to any 
federally assisted programs.11011 
That portion of subsection (g) defining the compensation due to 
the mmer of the land on which an advertising sign is located when 
the sign is removed is also quite ambiguous. It is clear that the land-
mmer must be compensated for the loss of his rights under the exist-
ing advertising lease or other rental agreement with the sign owner. 
But what about the landmmer's right to erect and maintain, or to 
authorize others to erect and maintain, advertising signs in the future? 
The use of the plural in the final phrase of subsection (g)111 suggests 
109. Cf. Chaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964), 
where, in dealing with the question whether the police power could be used to eliminate 
lawfully erected signs made nonconforming by a state law designed to implement the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, the court said, "There is nothing to indicate that 
they ever became fixtures so as to be part of the real estate." 176 Ohio St. at 440, 200 
N.E.2d at 339. The implication was that if the signs were not "part of the real estate" 
there would be no right to compensation for them when removal was required. But 
Chaster Properties involved the constitutionality of a statute that did not provide for 
compensation. 
110. This conclusion is based mainly on the repeated statements during the Senate 
and House hearings and debates, by proponents of compensation, that equity or fairness 
requires payment of compensation even if the federal or state constitutions do not. 
See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 43 (Sen. Randolph: "Perhaps [use of 
police power without compensation] is legal, we would say, but is it equitable?"); 1965 
House Hearings, supra note 21, at 46 (Rep. Edmondson: "The problem ••• may not 
be so much constitutional as moral .•. "). 
110a. Pub. L. No. 91-646, § 202(a), 84 Stat. 1895 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a) 
(1970)). This provision is made applicable to state agencies under certain circumstances 
by 42 U.S.C. § 4628 (1970). 
111. In paragraph (A) of subsection (g), dealing with the sign owner's interest, the 
singular is used: "all right, title, leasehold, and interest in such sign, display, or device" 
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that Congress intended to require payment of just compensation for 
the taking of what would amount to a permanent negative easement 
in the land-that is, a perpetual restriction against erection and 
maintenance of "such signs, displays and devices thereon." But the 
congressional intent is not clear from the language of subsection 
(g), and the legislative history is of little assistance on this point.112 
Perhaps it would be more consistent with the traditional zoning 
law approach to nonconforming uses to construe subsection (g) as 
requiring compensation only for the loss of the landmmer's rights 
under the existing lease or other rental agreement, thus permitting 
the state to prohibit future erection of signs within the control 
area through police power regulation. The former Bureau of Public 
Roads seems initially to have adopted this construction, with one 
minor qualification,113 but the current position of the Federal High-
(emphasis added). But in paragraph (B), dealing with the landowner's interest, the 
plural is used: "the right to erect and maintain such signs, displays, and devices thereon" 
(emphasis added). 
112. The colloquy between Senators Holland and Randolph, Ill CoNG. REc. 23879 
(1965), is inconclusive. Senator Holland said, "The Senator realizes that when it comes 
to condemnation along the primary roads, it involves buying up easements of 600 feet 
on each side of the roadway; does he not?" Senator Randolph replied, "Yes, where ad-
vertising structures are now maintained under agreements in effect on date of enactment 
of the pending measure." Shortly thereafter, Senator Randolph said, "It is estimated 
that we shall need approximately $180 million for the advertising rights for the inter-
state and the primary systems. This means that signs, as well as easements, where the 
areas have been used for advertising, would be involved. \Ve do not contemplate the 
payment for easements over all systems, but only where the rights-of-way have been 
exercised." Ill CONG. REC. 23880 (1965). 
Later in the Senate debate, Senator Allott said: 
Mr. President, it is fairly easy to ascertain the cost of a sign. There is an invoice 
somewhere; there is a check somewhere which will show how much the sign cost. 
In addition to the sign, there is also the cost that the sign owner pays to the land-
owner for the use of the land for the erection of the sign. 
But I point out also that included here-and it cannot possibly be avoided-is 
payment to the landowner for the leasehold he has lost. No one can possibly begin 
to estimate the cost to this country, when these particular items are capitalized-
and paid for-and capitalization is the only way that these values can be ascer-
tained. 
For example, if an owner rents a space for the sum of S250 a year, the only 
possible way that the owner can be compensated for the loss of his lease to the 
sign owner is by the capitalization of that $250 or $500, or whatever it may be. 
Ill CONG. REc. 24234. This statement clearly indicates that Senator Allott, at least, 
thought that the interest taken from the landowner would be a perpetual negative ease-
ment. Otherwise, there would be no need to capitalize the annual sign rental to deter-
mine the landowner's compensation. 
113. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9, supra note 92, 11 5(a)(6), includes the 
following provision: "Federal funds may participate in payments made to landowners 
where existing signs are removed. While this payment is for the right to erect and 
maintain the existing signs, it may, insofar as Federal reimbursement is concerned, 
include purchase of the right to erect future signs in the control area under a si11gle 
ownership until such time as the State control law is effective and an agreement with 
Public Roads is executed or January I, 1968, whichever is earlier" (emphasis added). 
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way Administration is not clear.114 If subsection (g) is construed as 
requiring the state to take a permanent negative easement, the 
seventy-five per cent federal share that the state will be entitled 
to receive will be based on the amount required to compensate 
the landowner for the taking of such an easement, but if subsec-
tion (g) is construed as requiring the state to take only the land-
owner's rights under the existing advertising lease, the federal share 
will be calculated only with respect to such rights. 
C. The Constitutionality of Title I 
The constitutionality of federal grants-in-aid to the states, includ-
ing grants for highway purposes, is so well-settled as not to require 
discussion. But the just compensation provision in subsection (g) of 
title I of the Highway Beautification Act could raise a tenth amend-
ment issue115 in so far as it directs the states to pay compensation upon 
removal of nonconforming signs, even though the signs might con-
stitutionally be removed by use of the police power without compen-
sation.116 If subsection (g) were construed to make the payment of 
compensation absolutely mandatory, the tenth amendment issue 
would indeed be substantial. As we have seen, however, that con-
struction must be rejected in favor of one that makes payment man-
datory only to the extent that the states must pay just compensation if 
they wish to obtain a full allocation of federal-aid highway funds and 
avoid the ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b) of title l.117 
Under this construction of subsection (g), the tenth amendment argu-
ment is difficult for the states to make. As the Acting Attorney General 
pointed out in his opinion sustaining the constitutionality of sub-
section (g),118 the Supreme Court has consistently upheld statutory 
provisions conditioning the grant of federal funds upon state com-
114. 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.303(c), .3ll(c), .312 &: pt. 750, app. A, pts. V, VII (1973). 
115. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states, respec-
tively, or to the people." Tenth amendment arguments typically raise the question 
whether a federal program impinges upon the states' right of self-government or their 
right to e.xercise the police power. 
116. This is the second point discussed in the opinion of Acting Attorney General 
Clark, issued in response to a request from the Secretary of Commerce. See 42 OP. ATIY. 
Gm. No. 26, at 5-9 (1966). In Lamm v. Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202 (10th Cir. 1971), the court 
affirmed a summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that plaintiff had no 
standing as a Colorado citizen and taxpayer to raise the tenth amendment issue, and 
that the case was moot because of the enactment in Colorado of "a just compensation 
statute in compliance with ••• the Federal Act." 449 F.2d at 1205. 
117. See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra. 
ll8. 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26, at 5-9 (1966). 
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pliance with certain federal standards.119 The only requirements ap-
pear to be that the "means ... are appropriate and plainly adapted 
to the permitted end"120 and that they not be arbitrary.121 
The Acting Attorney General concluded that a ten per cent re-
duction in federal highway funds was an appropriate and well 
adapted means to achieve one of the goals of the Highway Beautifica-
tion Act.122 I concur. The argument of Lamm and Yasinow that with-
holding federal highway funds is an arbitrary and unreasonable 
method of securing compliance with the Act's beautification pro-
gram123 is ill-conceived: It ignores the traffic safety argument for 
billboard removal and does not recognize that aesthetic considerations 
may be as important as engineering considerations in the creation 
of a national highway system. Withholding federal highway funds 
to induce compliance with the billboard removal provisions of the 
Highway Beautification Act is not unrelated to the federal objectives 
of the entire federal-aid highway program, although withholding 
highway funds as a means of achieving nonhighway objectives would 
lack the requisite relatedness and therefore be arbitrary and unrea-
sonable.124 Given the close nexus between the objectives of the 
Highway Beautification Act and the more general purposes of the 
federal-aid highway program, it is unlikely that subsection (g) or any 
other part of title I of the Act could be found to be constitutionally 
defective. 
119. E.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Massa• 
chusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
120. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), quoted in Oklahoma v. United 
States Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). See also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 590-191 (1937). 
121. 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26, at 8 (1966). 
122. Id. at 8-9. 
123. The distinguishing element between the two cases cited by former Attorney 
General Clark and a case which could arise under the Highway Beautification Act 
of 1965 is obvious. In Massachusetts [v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)] matching funds 
for maternal and child health care were to be denied where federally-approved pro-
grams designed for that purpose were not utilized. In Oklahoma [v. United States 
Civil Sero. Commn., 330 U.S. 127 (1947)] a state highway official could be dismissed 
by the Federal Government for violation of a federal law, where the Federal Gov• 
ernment participated in highway development in that state. But under the 1965 
Act, a state which refuses to participate in a national program of beautification not 
only forfeits Federal Government participation in the state's beautification effort, 
i.e., a 75 percent share of compensation payments, but must also sustain a 10 per-
cent loss of federal funds for a defense-commerce project, the construction of high-
ways. Analogous to the situation at hand would be a forfeiture of federal funds 
used in the construction of a state's medical facilities as a result of the state's un-
willingness to comply with a federal program of recreation-area development. 
The two contentions appear equally preposterous. 
Lamm &: Yasinow, supra note 48, at 446 (emphasis original). 
124. With all due respect, the "analogy" drawn by Lamm and Yasinow, supra note 
123, is "preposterous." 
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II. THE STATE LEGISLATION 
A. In General 
1327 
The reaction of the state legislatures to title I of the Highway 
Beautification Act was mixed. Some states rushed to enact com-
pliance laws, while others delayed the adoption of any implementing 
legislation for several years. By mid-1970, only thirty-two states had 
enacted compliance laws. Only eighteen of these had legislation that, 
as of July I, 1970, was deemed by the Secretary of Transportation to 
be in full compliance with title I; of the remaining fourteen, nine 
had legislation that clearly did not comply with title I, and five had 
legislation raising substantial doubts as to its compliance. Fifteen 
additional states had highway advertising control legislation enacted 
for purposes other than that of complying with title I, the legislation 
in ten of these fifteen states having been adopted wholly or partly to 
qualify for the bonus provided by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1958. Three states had no highway advertising control legislation 
at all.125 
The delays in state legislative implementation of title I seem to 
have been due to a number of factors, including the following: 
(I) The bitter opposition of the billboard industry; 
(2) Initial uncertainties as to whether title I would be construed 
as mandating the payment of just compensation when lawfully 
erected nonconforming signs were removed from control areas;126 
(3) The unwillingness of many states to authorize payment of 
just compensation unless (a) funds were available to cover the 
seventy-five per cent federal share and (b) there was a serious 
threat that the Federal Highway Administrator would impose the 
ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b) of title I; 
(4) The failure of Congress to provide substantial funds for the 
billboard program prior to fiscal year 1970, coupled with the 1968 
amendment of title I adding subsection (n), which provides that no 
advertising signs "shall be required to be removed under this section 
if the Federal share of the just compensation to be paid upon removal 
•.. is not available to make such payment" ;127 and 
125. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 42, at 23-29, £or a detailed discussion of the state 
compliance laws. 
126, This uncertainty was not resolved until (a) the Acting Attorney General issued 
his opinion of November 16, 1966, 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26 (1966), discussed in text 
accompanying notes 53-67 supra, and (b) the decision in Markham Advertising Co. v. 
State, 7ll Wash. 2d 405, 439 P .2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 70-84 supra. 
127. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(d), 82 Stat. 817 (codi-
fied at 2ll U.S.C. § 13l(n) (1970)). 
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(5) The unwillingness of the Federal Highway Administrator 
to impose the ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b) even 
where a state made no attempt to comply with title l.128 
Beginning in 1970, however, Congress provided substantial federal 
funds for the billboard removal program, and the Federal Highway 
Administrator put increasing pressure on the recalcitrant states to 
adopt compliance laws, if they had not previously done so, and to re-
vise existing billboard control legislation that did not fully comply 
with title I requirements. As a result of this pressure, every state but 
one now has a compliance law129 that the Secretary of Transportation 
has found to meet the requirements of title l.130 The one exception, 
South Dakota, brought suit in 1972 to challenge the Secretary's de-
termination that its billboard control statute was not in compliance 
with title I of the Highway Beautification Act as of January I, 1972, 
128. The Secretary for the first and only time imposed the ten per cent penalty 
on South Dakota, with respect to its fiscal-year allocation of federal-aid highway funds, 
on March 1, 1972, to be effective March 31, 1972. His action was sustained in South 
Dakota v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1973), discussed in note 131 infra and accom-
panying text. 
129. ALA. CoDE tit. 23, §§ 64(17)-(35) (Supp. 1971); ALAS. STAT.§§ 19.25.080-.180 (1972); 
Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-711 to -720 (Supp. 1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-2501 to 
-2512 (Supp. 1971); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200-5486 (West Supp. 1973); Coto. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 120-5-1 to -28 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 13a-123 to 
-123b (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1101-25 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 479.01-24 (1965), as amended, FLA. STAT, ANN. §§ 479.01-.24 (Supp. 1972); GA. Com; 
ANN. §§ 95-2001 to -2020a (1972); HAWAII REv. STAT, §§ 264-71 to -90 (1968); IDAHO 
CODE §§ 40-2811 to -2838 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, §§ 501-16 (Supp. 1973); 
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 36-3501 to -3545 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 306B.I-.8, 
306C.I0-.21 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-2231 to -2243 (1972); KY. REv. STAT. 
§§ 177.830-.890 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.461-.461.8 (Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT, 
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 2711-23 (Supp. 1972); MD. CODE ANN. art. 89B, §§ 226-35, 250-62 (1969), 
as amended, MD. CODE ANN. art. 89B, § 252 (Supp. 1972); ch. 1070, [1971] Mass. Acts 
1016 (partially codified at MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93D, §§ 1-7 (Supp. 1972)); MICH. COMP. 
LAws ANN. §§ 252.301-.324 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT, ANN. §§ 173.01-.27 (Supp. 1973); 
MISS, CODE ANN. §§ 8059.5-01 to -17 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.500-.600 (Supp. 
1973); ch. 2, [1971] Mont. Laws 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1816; NEB. REv. STAT, §§ 39-1302-
(36) to -(39), 39-1320.01 to .11 (Supp. 1972); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 410.220-.410 (1971); N.H. 
REV. STAT, ANN.§§ 249-A:1 to :19 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 27:7A-ll to -22 (Supp. 
1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-11-1 to -7.1 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. HWY. LAW § 88 (McKinney 
Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 136.126-.140 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT, CODE ANN. 
§§ 24-17-01 to -15 (1970); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5516.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1972); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN, tit. 69, §§ 1272-84 (Supp. 1972); ORE, REV. STAT. §§ 377.505-.545, .700-.992 
(1971); PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 2718.101-.115 (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 24-
10.1-1 to -12 (1968), as amended, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 24-10.1-3, -6 (Supp. 1972); No. 
930 [1971] S.C. Acts 2061; TENN, CODE ANN.§§ 54-2601 to -2617 (Supp. 1972); TEX. REv. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6674v-1, §§ 1-8, 10-15 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 27-12-136.1 
to .13 (1969), as amended, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-136.2 to .11 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3683a, 3688 (1970), tit. 10, §§ 321-45 (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33.1-
351 to -381 (1970), as amended, VA. CODE ANN.§ 33.1-355 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REv. CODE 
ANN. §§ 47.42.020-.911 (Supp. 1972), amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 47.42.010-.910 
(1961); W. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 17-22-1 to -25 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 84-30 (Supp. 
1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-110 to -124 (Supp. 1971). 
130. S. REP. No. 92-1081, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 SENATE 
REPORT]. 
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and to compel the Secretary to pay the portion (ten per cent or $3,-
361,546.60) of the federal-aid highway funds withheld for fiscal 1973 
to which South Dakota would otherwise have been entitled. In addi-
tion, South Dakota sought to overturn the Secretary's proposed de-
terminations that, despite an amendment to the state's compliance 
law enacted on February 17, 1972, and effective on July l, 1972, the 
law was still not in compliance with title I and that the ten per cent 
penalty should consequently be assessed against the funds to be ap-
portioned to South Dakota for fiscal 1974 as well. In a recent decision 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of South 
Dakota entered a summary judgment upholding the Secretary's de-
terminations on all points.131 
B. Areas Subject to "Effective Control" 
The areas adjacent to highways that are subject to "effective con-
trol" are generally defined in the state compliance laws in substan-
131. South Dakota v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1973). In holding S.D. COMP. 
LAws ANN. §§ 31-29-15 to -60 (1967), as amended, S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 31-29-20 to 
-40 (Supp. 1972) (in force on Jan. 1, 1972), not to be in compliance with title I of the 
Highway Beautification Act, the court sustained the Secretary's determinations that 
(I) The statute's highway corridor zoning provisions (section 31-29-20), which establish 
mileage zones along the interstate and primary highways, did not satisfy "traditional 
zoning requisites" and were "not consistent with the Act's purpose." 3!:3 F. Supp. at 341. 
For example, on Interstate 90, crossing the state from east to west, there would be only 
two short segments, each about two miles long, in which billboards would not have been 
permitted. 
(2) Section 31-29-42 of the statute "precludes meaningful negotiations" for an agree-
ment with the Secretary as to "unzoned" commercial and industrial areas by virtue of 
the restrictive conditions contained therein. 353 F. Supp. at 341. 
(3) The statute's "customary use" standards as to size, lighting, and spacing of per-
mitted signs were "unacceptable" because they "failed to attain the level of any stan-
dards between a state and the Administrator previously accepted" by the Federal High-
way Administrator. 353 F. Supp. at 341. 
The court also held that the Secretary's "proposed determination" as to the 1972 
amendments to the statute, ch. 171, [1972] S.D. Laws 198 (codified at S.D. CoMP. LAws 
ANN. §§ 31-29-20 to -40 (Supp. 1972)), should not be reviewed de novo. 353 F. Supp. at 
342-43. However, "in an effort to clarify the existing conflicts between the Secretary and 
the State and to prepare a foundation for future acceptable legislation," the court gave 
what seems in substance to be a declaratory judgment as to the 1972 amendments, as 
follows: 
(a) Section 31-29-20, despite the 1972 amendment, remains "arbitrary." 
(b) The 1972 amendment to § 31-29-40 has partially corrected deficiencies in the size 
and lighting provisions of the statute, "leaving spacing for further negotiations." 
(c) The definition of "unzoned" commercial and industrial areas in§ 31-29-39 remains 
unacceptable. 
(d) Section 31-29-42 "locks the state negotiators in" and is still "too restrictive to 
promote meaningful negotiations." 353 F. Supp. at 343. 
In conclusion, the court "strongly" suggested "that the South Dakota Legislature 
initiate immediate steps for appropriate legislation to correct these objectionable pro-
visions," adding that it did so because, "even if I had the authority to rule on the 1972 
laws which sought to bring the State into compliance with the Federal Act, I would find 
them not in compliance, therefore placing the State in jeopardy of losing a second ten 
per cent in its federal highway appropriations." 353 F. Supp. at 343-44. 
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tially the same way as in title I of the Highway Beautification Act: as 
areas "along the Interstate System and the primary system ... within 
six hundred and sixty feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way and 
visible from the main traveled way of the system."132 However, a few 
of the state compliance laws are more restrictive. In Colorado,133 
Oregon,134 Vermont,135 Washington,136 and "\,Vyoming,137 the controls 
extend to any off-premises signs visible from the highway, and in 
Utah,138 to any off-premises signs "capable of being read or compre-
hended with respect to advertising or informational content ... from 
any place on the main-traveled way." The Oregon statute exempts 
signs more than 660 feet from the highway within city limits "unless 
the sign is designed to be viewed primarily from the state highway,''130 
but it prohibits even on-premises signs "where one or more parts or 
sides of the sign are so located as to be readable primarily by the 
traveling public from any point on a limited access state highway if 
there is no access to the sign premises within a distance of one mile 
of such point on either side of the sign."140 
Some of the state laws impose controls on areas adjacent to turn-
pikes, 141 limited-access highways,142 secondary highways,143 or spe-
cially designated scenic highways,144 as well as on areas adjacent to in-
terstate and federal-aid primary highways. 
C. Police Power Controls) Exceptions) and Permits 
The state compliance laws without exception rely on the police 
power to control future billboard construction along the interstate 
and federal-aid primary highway systems. In accordance with title I 
of the Highway Beautification Act, construction of new billboards 
is prohibited within the controlled areas, with the common excep-
tions of (1) "directional and other official signs and notices,''1411 (2) 
132. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(b) (1970). 
133. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 120-5-2, -12, -18 (Supp. 1971). 
134. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 377.715, .720 (1971). 
135. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 328-35 (Supp. 1972). 
136. WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§§ 47.42.030, .040, .062 (Supp. 1972). 
137. WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 24-113 (Supp. 1971). 
138. UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.4 (Supp. 1971). 
139. ORE. REV. STAT. § 377.735(3) (1971). 
140. ORE. REv. STAT. § 377.720(2) (1971). 
141. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 177-840 (1971). 
142. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 177-840 (1971). 
143. E.g., Al.As. STAT. § 19.25.105 (1972). 
144. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 47.42.020(7), .030 (Supp. 1972). 
145. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c)(l) (1970). 
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"signs ... advertising the sale or lease of property upon which they 
are located,"146 (3) "signs ... advertising activities conducted on the 
property on which they are located,"147 (4) all signs in areas "zoned 
industrial or commercial under authority of State law,"148 and (5) all 
signs in "unzoned commercial or industrial areas as may be deter-
mined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary 
[of Transportation]."149 
All the state compliance laws, except those in Alaska, Hawaii, and 
Vermont, allow off-premises signs in areas "zoned industrial or com-
mercial under authority of State law." The Kentucky statute, how-
ever, only allows off-premises signs "which otherwise comply with 
the applicable zoning ordinances and regulations of any county or 
city, and which are to be located in a commercially or industrially 
developed area, in which the Commissioner of Highways determines, 
in exercise of his sound discretion, that the location of such advertis-
ing devices is compatible with the safety and convenience of the 
traveling public."150 Both Idaho and Texas have somewhat similar 
restrictions on the location of signs in zoned commercial or industrial 
areas. The Idaho statute provides that "areas abutting interstate and 
primary highways . . . which are zoned commercial or industrial by 
counties and municipalities shall be valid as commercial or industrial 
zones only as to the portions actually used for commerce or industrial 
purposes and [do] not include areas so zoned in anticipation of such 
uses at some uncertain future date nor does it include areas so zoned 
for the primary purpose of allowing advertising structures."151 The 
Texas statute allows off-premises signs "in areas in which the land 
use is designated industrial or commercial under authority of law, 
such areas to be determined from actual land uses and defined by 
regulations established by the [highway] commission.''152 In all three 
states, it would seem that commercial or industrial zoning by local 
governments is irrelevant unless the area is actually developed for 
commercial or industrial uses. 
All the states except Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Vermont, 
and Washington (as to interstate highways only) allow off-premises 
signs in unzoned commercial and industrial areas. All the states, 
146. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(c)(2) (1970). 
147. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(c)(3) (1970). 
148. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970). 
149. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970). 
150. KY. R.Ev. STAT. § 177.860(4) (1971). 
151. IDAHO CODE § 40-2829 (Supp. 1972). 
152. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6674v-l, § 4(A)(4) (Supp. 1972). 
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except those listed above and South Dakota, now have statutes that 
either contain firm definitions of unzoned commercial and industrial 
areas that are satisfactory to the Federal Highway Administration as 
a basis for the agreement benveen the state and the Secretary of 
Transportation required by title I, 153 or define such areas by reference 
to a previously executed154 or prospective155 agreement between the 
state and the Secretary. 
All the states in which off-premises signs are permitted, except 
South Dakota, now have either (1) firm statutory standards as to the 
size, lighting, and spacing of such signs, 156 (2) provisions for the defi-
nition of such standards by negotiation and agreement between the 
state and the Secretary of Transportation,157 or (3) provisions for the 
definition of such standards by regulations, consistent with national 
standards or national policy, to be promulgated by the state highway 
director or agency.158 The latter provisions have apparently been 
construed to mean "determined by agreement between the several 
States and the Secretary," since the Secretary has found all these states, 
except South Dakota, to be in full compliance with title I of the 
Act.159 In many cases, a statute first sets out firm standards and then 
authorizes agreements with the Secretary without indicating what 
the state highway agency is to do if the Secretary will not agree to the 
statutory standards.160 In a few instances, the statute first sets out 
"firm" standards and then authorizes the state highway agency to 
"modify, vary or supplement" such standards in order to insure re-
ceipt of the maximum amount of federal-aid highway funds.161 Other 
statutes authorize the state highway agency to promulgate regulations 
setting standards consistent with "customary use" and the policy of 
the statute, and in agreement with the Secretary.162 In some states, the 
standards in zoned commercial and industrial areas may be different 
from those in unzoned commercial and industrial areas if the local 
153. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5223 (West Supp. 1973). 
154. See, e.g., N.Y. HWY. LAW § 88(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
155. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-2505 (Supp. 1971). 
156. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2234 (1972). 
157. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3504 (Supp. 1972). 
158. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 40-2833 (Supp. 1972). 
159. See 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 15. 
160. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-2234, -2235 (1972); KY. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 177.863, 
.890 (1971 ). 
161. See, e.g., LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 48.461.4 (Supp. 1973). 
162. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-2505 (Supp. 1971). 
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zoning regulations contain standards consistent with the statutory 
policy.103 
"[D]irectional and other official signs and notices ... which are 
required or authorized by law" are generally excepted from the title 
I ban on new signs in controlled areas but must "conform to national 
standards . . . authorized to be promulgated by the Secretary . . . 
which standards shall contain provisions concerning the lighting, size, 
number, and spacing of signs .... "164 Title I also authorizes the 
Secretary, "in consultation with the States," to "provide within the 
rights-of-way for areas at appropriate distances from interchanges on 
the Interstate System, on which signs, displays, and devices giving 
specific information in the interest of the traveling public may be 
erected and maintained," such signs to "conform to national stan-
dards to be promulgated by the Secretary."165 With respect to these 
classes of signs, most of the state statutes either incorporate the na-
tional standards promulgated by the Secretary,160 authorize the 
promulgation of regulations consistent with the "national standards" 
or "national policy,"167 or provide a general authorization for the 
highway director or agency to enter into an agreement with the Secre-
tary to implement the statute.168 Georgia, however, has more restric-
tive standards for directional signs than those promulgated by the 
Secretary.160 
Most of the states use a permit system to regulate the erection of 
new billboards of the types permitted by their compliance laws.170 
163. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 17, § lllO (Supp. 1970). 
164. 23 U.S.C. § 13I(c)(l) (1970). 
165. 23 u.s.c. § 131(£) (1970). 
166. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7A-16(a) (Supp. 1972). The national standards 
for "directional and other official signs" are set out in 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.151- .155 (1973); 
the national standards for "official highway signs within interstate rights-of-way giving 
specific service information for the traveling public" are set out in 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.201-
.210 (1973). 
167. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-12(b) (Supp. 1971) ("directional and other 
official advertising devices and notices"); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-123(c) (Supp. 1973) 
(applicable to "directional or other official signs and notices" permitted by § 13a-
123(e)(l)). 
168. Se&, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § ll24 (Supp. 1970) ("signs, displays, and 
devices providing information in the interest of the traveling public"). 
169. See GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2005a (1972). 
170. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 120-5-18 to -21 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 17, §§ 1104, 1106 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 479.07-.10 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 95-2008a to -2010a (1972); IDAHO CODE §§ 40-2820 to -2826 (Supp. 1972); !LL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 508 (Supp. 1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2714 (Supp. 1972); 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 173.03, .06, .07, .13 (Supp. 1973); Mrss. CODE ANN.§ 8059.5-06 (Supp. 
1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.530 (Supp. 1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 249-A:4 (Supp. 
1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:7A-14 to -17 (Supp. 1973); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5516.10 
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In some of these states on-premises signs are exempt from the permit 
requirement.171 All the states that use a permit system provide that 
a new billboard erected without the required permit is "illegal" and 
may be removed in a relatively summary manner unless a permit 
is obtained within a short grace period.172 In some states the permit 
requirement also applies to existing billboards-conforming, non-
conforming, or both.173 In some cases, permit provisions applicable 
to existing signs appear to be designed to create so much red tape 
that the sign owner will not bother to comply unless his sign is really 
valuable.174 Some of the statutes provide that failure to apply for a 
permit within a stated period creates a conclusive presumption of 
abandonment of the sign.175 
D. Nonconforming Signs: Removal and Determination of 
Just Compensation 
The provisions in the state compliance laws relating to removal of 
nonconforming advertising signs and payment of just compensation 
tend to incorporate some or all of the language of title I, subsection 
(g) of the Highway Beautification Act. For example, the New York 
compliance law authorizes the commissioner of transportation to 
acquire and pay compensation for nonconforming signs "lawfully in 
existence" on October 22, 1965 (the date of the enactment of the 
federal Act), "lawfully along any highway made a part of the inter-
state or primary highway systems on or after" October 22, 1965, or 
"lawfully erected on or after" January I, 1968. Compensation is to 
be paid for "(a) the taking from the owner of such sign ... of 
all right, title, leasehold and interest in such sign, ... and (b) the 
taking from the owner of the real property on which such sign . . . 
is located, of the right to erect and maintain such signs ... thereon."176 
It should be noted that the New York statutory language almost-
(Page Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit, 69, § 1277 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. 
§ 377.725 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 36, § 2718.107 (Supp. 1973); TENN, CoDE ANN, 54-2604 
to -2607 (Supp. 1972); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6674v-l, §§ 6-7 (Supp. 1972): UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 27-12-1367 (Supp. 1971); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 47.42.120 (Supp. 1972); 
WYO. STAT, ANN, §§ 24-116 to -117 (Supp. 1971). 
171. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 479,16 (1965); GA. CODE ANN,§ 95-2009a (1972); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 68-2236(a)-{c) (1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2715(1) (Supp. 1972). 
172. See, e.g., MICH. COMP, LAws ANN. § 252.319 (Supp. 1973). 
173. See, e.g., COLO, REv. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-18(1) (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 
17, ' 1104 (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2009a (1972). 
174. See, e.g., MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 252,305-.312 (Supp. 1973). 
175. See, e.g., COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 120·5-22(3)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1971). 
176. N.Y, HWY, LAW§ 88(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
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but not quite-literally reproduces the language of title I, subsection 
(g) of the Act, with the result that no compensation is payable upon 
removal of outdoor advertising signs lawfully erected along existing 
interstate and primary highways between October 22, 1965, and Janu-
ary I, 1968, although compensation is payable upon removal of signs 
lawfully erected along such highways before October 22, 1965, and 
after January I, 1968-including those erected between January I, 
1968, and the effective date of the New York statute, June 16, 1968. 
But the New York statute requires payment of compensation upon 
removal of all signs lawfully erected along secondary or other high-
ways that become part of the interstate or federal-aid primary systems 
at any time after October 22, 1965-whether before or after January 
l, 1968. Many other state compliance laws literally repeat the lan-
guage of title I, subsection (g), which does not cover those highways 
converted after January I, 1968, and, consequently, exclude payment 
of compensation upon removal of signs along such highways.177 
The New York statute and others like it obviously discriminate 
against persons with property interests in signs lawfully erected be-
tween October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968. A number of states,178 
perhaps cognizant of the unfairness of this discrimination, have en-
acted compliance laws that provide for compensation upon the re-
moval of any nonconforming sign lawfully in existence at the date 
of enactment of the compliance law, although it appears that the 
Federal Highway Administration will not authorize payment of the 
federal share with respect to signs lawfully erected in the period 
between October 22, 1965, and January 1, 1968.179 At least one state, 
Florida, compensates for this latter fact with a statutory provision that 
the general prohibition of removal of nonconforming signs unless 
the federal share of the mandated just compensation is available 
"shall not apply to signs erected between October 22, 1965, and 
January 1, 1968."180 The Georgia statute, on the other hand, author-
177. See, e.g., CAL. nus.&: PROF. CODE§ 5412(b) (West Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § l.3a-123(t)(2) (Supp. 1973); KY. R.Ev. STAT. § 177.867(l)(b) (1971); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 8059.5-09 (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 33.l-370(e)(2) (1970). 
178. Aus. STAT. § 19.25.140 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-2508 (Supp. 1971); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 95-20ll(a) (1972): HAWAII REv. STAT. § 264-75 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 40-2831 
(Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2238 (1972); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 461.6 (Supp. 
1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 89B, § 254 (1969); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 252.322 (Supp. 
1973); ch. 2, § 9, [1971] Mont. Sess. Law 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1816; N.H. R.Ev. STAT. 
ANN.§ 249-A:ll (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 136-131 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 24-17-05 (1970); R.I. GEN. LAws § 24-10.1-6 (Supp. 1972); S.D. CoMP. LAws 
ANN. § 31-29-50 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.ll (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-22-5 (Supp. 1970). 
179. 23 C.F.R. § 750.308(a) (1973), restating the substance of title I, subsection (g). 
180. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 479.24(3) (Supp. 1972), 
1336 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1295 
izes payment of compensation for the taking of "any property rights 
in outdoor advertising signs ... lawfully in existence on the effective 
date of this Chapter but which do not conform to the provisions of 
this Chapter" and then goes on to provide that the State Highway 
Department "shall be prohibited from paying more than 25 per cent 
of any award for just compensation."181 Since the seventy-five per cent 
federal share is not available for nonconforming signs erected be-
tween October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968, Georgia will not be 
able to comply with both provisions if the signs are to be removed. 
Nor can the signs be left in place, for in that case Georgia will not be 
in compliance with title I of the Highway Beautification Act and will 
be subject to the ten per cent penalty for failure to provide "effective 
control" of highway advertising.182 
Several other state compliance laws contain provisions that seem 
to be inconsistent with the provisions on the removal of nonconform-
ing signs in title I of the Act. For example, the Minnesota statute 
contains a declaration that "each advertising device in existence in 
a business area on June 8, 1971, and which fails to comply with the 
provisions of Laws 1971, Chapter 883, only as to size, lighting or 
spacing may remain in place."183 The Nebraska statute contains a 
similar provision.184 But these provisions are in accord with the 
agreements entered into benveen the states and the Secretary of 
Transportation.185 
Many of the state compliance laws allow a maximum of five years 
for the removal of any nonconforming signs; the five years are to be 
measured from the date when the signs became nonconforming under 
the state law.186 Some state laws establish a date or a period prior to 
181. GA. Com; ANN. § 95.201 la (1972). 
182. See 23 U.S.C. §§ 13l(b)·(c) (1970). 
183. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 173.26 (Supp. 1973). 
184. "Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require the removal of 
signs in zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas ••. lawfully in e.xistence 
on the effective date of this act, which signs may under this act remain and continue 
in place even if nonconforming." No. 1181, § 7(2)(b)(vi), [1972] Neb. Laws 718 
(emphasis added). 
Signs "erected prior to the effective date of this act may continue in zoned or 
unzoned commercial or industrial areas, notwithstanding the fact that such •.• signs 
•.. do not comply with standards and criteria established by this act or regulations of 
the department as promulgated from time to time." No. 1181, § 9, [1972] Neb. Laws 
718. 
185. See note 12 supra. 
186. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-28(3) (Supp. 1971) ("before January 1, 
1976" but not until federal share is available, and no state funds to be used unless 
the federal share is available); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 479.23 (Supp. 1972) ("by the end of 
the fifth year after they have become nonconforming"); NEV. REv. STAT. § 410.340 (1971) 
(with the exception that signs lawfully in existence on Sept. 1, 1965, must be removed 
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which the removal of nonconforming signs may not be required.187 
And other state compliance laws establish at least a general schedule 
for the removal of nonconforming signs of different classes.188 
As for the interests to be taken, many of the state compliance laws, 
like the New York statute discussed above,189 simply repeat the title I 
language with respect to the sign owner's interest for which compen-
sation is to be paid: "all right, title, leasehold, and interest in such 
sign."100 But a few of the statutes spell out the interest more precisely. 
For example, the California statute says, "all right, title, and interest, 
including any leasehold interest, of the owner of the advertising dis-
play."191 Some of the state statutes, again like the New York statute,192 
no later than July 1, 1973, or three years from the date funds are available for such 
removal); OKI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1278(a) (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 84-30(5) 
(Supp. 1973). For a three-year deadline, see WASH. R.Ev. CoDE ANN.§ 47.42.100(4) (Supp. 
1972). 
187. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 40-2830 (Supp. 1972) ("may not be required to be re-
moved until July 1, 1970, unless required to be removed prior thereto by order of the 
department," but "shall be removed on or before the end of the 60th month after it shall 
become nonconforming, ••. provided ••• matching federal-aid funds are available''); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 121, § 509 (Supp. 1973) (only "after July 1, 1973"); IND. ANN. STAT. 
§ 36-3506 (Supp. 1972) (not within 60 months after erection and nQt before July 1, 
1970, if sign was lawfully in existence on October 22, 1965; "any other sign lawfully 
erected which does not on January 1, 1968, or at any time thereafter, conform to this 
act, shall not be required to be removed until the fifth year after it becomes non-
conforming''); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2237 (1972) (not until March 31, 1974, if "lawfully 
in existence" on effective date and "not located in a business area"; removal of signs 
later becoming nonconforming because located on a highway made part of the inter-
state or primary system after March 31, 1972, not be required to be removed until end 
of the fifth year after they become nonconforming); ch. 1070, § 4, [1971] Mass. Acts 1017 
(signs lawfully in existence on effective date of state act "shall not be required to be re-
moved ••• until five years after" that date); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8059.508 (Supp. 1972) 
(signs lawful but nonconforming on date of state act, not before July I, 1970; other 
~igns, not until fifth year after they become nonconforming); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 226.570 
(Supp. 1973) (not "until such removal is required by the secretary of transportation''); 
Omo R.Ev. CoDE ANN. § 5516.07 (Page Supp. 1972) ("director shall not require the re-
moval of any advertising device for which federal reimbursement is contemplated ••• 
unless, until, and to the extent that federal funds for the federal share have been 
appropriated ••• and made available''). 
188. See, e.g., ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 377.765(2)-(4) (1971). 
189. See text accompanying note 176 supra. 
190. 23 u.s.c. § 13l(g)(A) (1970). See, e.g., COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-28(3) (Supp. 
1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 1122(b)(l) (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2012a(a) 
(1972); IDAHO CODE § 40-2831(2)(a) (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 121, § 509 (Supp. 
1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3507 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2238(b)(l) (1972); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 8059.5-09(2)(a) (Supp. 1972); Mo. STAT, ANN. § 226.5701(1) (Supp. 
197:3); No. 1181, § 4, [1972] Neb. Laws 714, amending NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 39-1320.01 
(1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.109(b) (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-2608(b) 
(Supp. 1972); TEX. R.Ev. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6674v-l, § 4(E) (Supp. 1972); WASH, R.Ev. 
CODE ANN. 47.42.102(2) (Supp. 1972). 
191. CAL. Bus. &: PROF. CODE § 5412 (West Supp. 1973). 
192. See text accompanying note 176 supra. See also, to the same effect, DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 17, § 1122(b)(2) (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2012a(b) (1972); IDAHO CODE 
§ 40-28:31(2)(a) (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3507 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
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also simply repeat the title I, subsection (g) language with respect to 
the landmvner',s interest for which just compensation must be paid: 
"the right to erect and maintain such signs, displays, and devices."193 
This sounds as if the legislature intended payment to be made for all 
future rights, in perpetuity, to erect and maintain such signs. But 
other states, such as California,194 use the singular in referring to the 
landowner's interest: "the right of the mvner of the real property on 
which the advertising display is located to erect and maintain such 
advertising display thereon."195 This sounds as if the legislature in-
tended to provide compensation only for the taking of the right to 
maintain the existing advertising sign on the land in question. As 
previously indicated,196 one of the difficult and still unsolved ques-
tions arising under title I, subsection (g) of the Highway Beautifica-
tion Act is whether the states must pay compensation for the taking 
of all of the landowners' present and future rights to maintain high-
way advertising signs on their land, or whether the landowners need 
only be compensated for the taking of the present right to maintain 
the existing advertising sign under the existing lease. Since the 
Federal Highway Administration regards both the California and 
the New York statutes, and statutes similar to either of them, as in 
compliance with title I, it apparently does not consider the difference 
in statutory language to be significant. 
A number of the state compliance laws state categorically that any 
removal of a nonconforming advertising sign shall be deemed a 
"taking" of the interests of the sign owner and the owner of the 
land on which the sign is located.197 This language surely is not in-
tended to prohibit the state from negotiating agreements with the 
O\vners of nonconforming signs and the land upon which such signs 
are located for the purchase of their interests,198 or providing for the 
§ 68-2238(b)(2) (1972); Miss CODE ANN. § 8059.09(2)(b) (Supp. 1972): Mo. STAT, ANN. 
§ 226.570(1) (Supp. 1973); No. 1181, § 4, [1972] Neb. Laws 714, amending NEB. REv. 
STAT.§ 39.1320.01 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 54-2608(b)(2) (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 47.42.102(2) (Supp. 1972). 
193. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(g)(B) (1970) (emphasis added). 
194. See text accompanying note 191 supra. See also, to the same effect, Coto. REv. 
STAT. ANN, § 120-5-28(3) (Supp. 1971): ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 121, § 509 (Supp. 1973); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 249-A:ll(I)(b) (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV, STAT. § 377.780(3)(b) (1971); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.109(b) (Supp. 1973); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 667'1v•l, 
§ 4(E) (Supp. 1972). 
195. CAL. Bus. &: PROF. CODE § 5412 (West Supp. 1973) (emphasis added). 
196. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra. 
197. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &: PROF, CODE § 5412 (West Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT, 
§ 36-3507 (Supp. 1972). 
198. Indeed, most of the state compliance laws expressly provide for either purchase 
or condemnation of signs and advertising rights. See, e.g., ALAS. STAT, § 19.25.140 
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removal of such signs without acquisition of title thereto and com-
pensating the sign owners on some other basis, such as the cost of 
relocating the sign. Rather, this statutory language seems designed to 
require the state to exercise the power of eminent domain in all cases 
where a purchase or removal agreement cannot be negotiated and to 
"take" and pay for all the property interests specified in the statute, 
including the sign owner's interest in the sign itself. This will prevent 
state highway agencies from acquiring all the real property interests 
of landowners and sign owners by negotiated purchase or condemna-
tion and then utilizing the police power to compel removal of the 
signs without payment for the sign owners' interests in the signs them-
selves.199 The same objective is apparently also sought by provisions 
-found in several state compliance laws-that all nonconforming . 
highway advertising signs shall be deemed to be "trade fixtures" and 
that sign owners shall be compensated for the signs' "fair market 
value" when they are removed.200 Such provisions will assure that, in 
the valuation of the sign owner's property interest in eminent domain 
proceedings, the value of the sign itself, "as part of the realty," will 
be included. Presumably these provisions are intended to settle an 
issue left unsettled by the states' existing case law. In any case, the 
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Poli-
cies Act of 1970 now requires the states, "to the greatest extent prac-
ticable under State law," to treat as real property any "structure" on 
real property to be acquired pursuant to any federally assisted pro-
gram, "notwithstanding the right or obligation of the tenant ... to 
remove such ... structure."200a The Act also requires payment of the 
cost of moving "personal property."2oob 
West Virginia's compliance law expressly provides for determina-
(1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13al23(f)(2) (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2011 
(1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3507 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2239 (1972); KY. 
Rev. STAT. § 177.867(1) (1971); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 48.461.6 (Supp. 1973); ME. REv. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 2719(1)-(3) (Supp. 1972); l\IISS. CODE ANN. § 8059.5-09(1) (Supp. 
1972); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 24-17-05 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.11(1) 
(Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-22-6 (Supp. 1970); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 24-119 
(Supp. 1971). 
199. See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra. 
200. See, e.g., N.l\I. STAT. ANN. § 55-11-6(B)(l) (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
69, § 1280(b) (Supp. 1972). See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5516.08 (Page Supp. 1972) 
(compensation shall be paid as in other highway acquisition cases, "notwithstanding 
the right or obligation of the owner of such advertising device, as against the owner 
of the real property on which the ••• device is located, to remove such device at any 
time'). 
200a. Pub. L. No. 91-646, § § 302, 305, 84 Stat. 1905-06 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 4652, 
4655 (1970)). 
200b. Pub. L. No. 91-646, § 202{a)(l), 84 Stat. 1895 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(l) 
(1970)). 
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tion of "the compensation to which the owner of the sign and lease-
hold interest is entitled, separate and apart from the compensation 
to which the o-wner of the real property is entitled."201 This provision 
was apparently included to prevent the application of the "unit rule," 
which ordinarily requires that the entire interest taken by eminent 
domain (usually a fee simple estate) be valued as a unit, without re-
gard to division of ownership between lessor and lessee or life tenant 
and remainderman. The New Mexico statute contains a similar 
provision. 202 
Perhaps the most interesting state statutory variation from the 
language of title I, subsection (g) is the provision for payment of 
severance damages found in the compliance laws of at least three states 
-Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The Utah statute provides: "For 
the purposes of this act, just compensation shall include, the con-
sideration of damages to remaining properties, contiguous and non-
contiguous, of an outdoor advertising sign company's interest, which 
remaining properties, together with the properties actually con-
demned, constituted an economic unit."203 The ·wyoming provision 
provides that "just compensation shall be deemed to include sever-
ance damages to the remaining property, taking into consideration the 
unique nature of outdoor advertising as affected by this act .... "204 
The Wisconsin statute provides that compensation shall include 
"severance damages to the remaining signs which have a unity of use 
and ownership with the sign taken ... excluding any damage to fac-
tories involved in manufacturing, erection, maintenance or servicing 
of any outdoor advertising signs or displays."205 
No prior law in these states either holds or suggests that an adver-
tising plant is an entity for eminent domain purposes in such a way 
that the taking of one or more signs would give rise to severance 
damages consisting of the "damages to the remainder of the outdoor 
advertising plant."206 Therefore, the question may fairly be raised 
whether federal funds can be made available under title I, subsection 
(g) for payment of seventy-five per cent of the "severance damages" 
determined in accordance with the Utah, Wisconsin, and ·wyoming 
201. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 17-22-6 (Supp. 1970). 
202. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55011-6(b) (Supp. 1971). 
203. UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.11(2) (Supp. 1973). 
204. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 24-119(b) (Supp. 1971). 
205. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 84.30(7) (Supp. 1973). 
206. Severance damages may arise in cases of partial taking if the difference be-
tween the value of the entire property before and after the taking is greater than the 
value of the part taken. The outdoor advertising plant includes all the advertising 
company's signboards, sign structures, storage buildings and areas, and office buildings. 
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statutes. The position of the former Bureau of Public Roads was 
made clear in its Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9, issued 
on l\farch 31, 1967, which stated: "Each sign shall be treated as a 
separate entity without regard to the effect its removal will have on 
the business operation of the owner."207 However, Federal Highway 
Administrator Bridwell apparently moderated the Bureau's position 
during his testimony at the 1967 Senate Hearings, in the course of 
which he said that the Department of Transportation had "no policy 
against" the payment of severance damages and that the Department's 
policy was to "pay for what a court determines to be just compensa-
tion."208 He was less certain, however, as to the effect of a state statute 
mandating payment of severance damages.209 The current position 
of the Federal Highway Administration is as follows: 
Generally, Federal participation will not be allowed in the payment 
of damages to remaining signs, or other property of a sign company 
alleged to be due to the taking of some of the company's signs. Unity 
of use of the separate properties, as required by applicable principles 
of eminent domain law, must be shown to exist before participation 
in severance damages will be allowed. Moreover, the value of the 
remaining signs or other real property must be diminished by virtue 
of the taking of such signs. Payments for damages to economic plants 
or loss of business profits are not compensable. The State shall have 
the burden of justifying the recognition of severance damages pur-
suant to FHWA right-of-way procedures and the law of the State 
before Federal participation will be allowed.210 
A complicating factor in Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming is that 
all three compliance laws appear to prohibit the removal of any non-
conforming sign unless federal participation in the payment of the 
required compensation is assured.211 There are obvious possibilities 
for substantial delay in the removal of nonconforming signs if these 
states attempt to carry out their statutory mandates to pay severance 
damages to highway advertising companies and the Federal Highway 
Administration is unwilling to participate in the payment of such 
damages. 212 
207. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9, supra note 92, fi 5a(7). 
208. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 33. 
209. Id. See also id. at 457. 
210. 23 C.F.R. § 750.3ll(d) (1973). The Federal Highway Administration's prohibi-
tion against compensation for "loss of business profits" is echoed in Omo REv. CODE 
ANN. § 5516.08 (Page Supp. 1972), which provides that in any action to appropriate 
advertising signs and associated property rights "loss of business shall not be considered 
an item of compensable damages." 
211. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 27-12-136.11(2) (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 84.30(15) 
(Supp. 1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 24-119(c) (Supp. 1971). 
212. It should be noted that several other states have statutory provisions that 
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Several other state compliance laws contain provisions relating to 
payment of just compensation that raise doubts either as to their 
validity under state constitutional limitations or their compliance 
with title I of the Highway Beautification Act. The Florida statute, 
for example, provides that compensation shall be paid for removal 
of "signs lawfully in existence on December 8, 1971 or signs which 
later became nonconforming," but compensation for any sign erected 
or completed after December 8, 1971, "shall be limited to the actual 
replacement value of the materials in such sign."213 And another 
subsection provides: "It is presumed that any party erecting a sign 
after July I, 1971 did so with the knowledge of the existing federal 
legislation and the pendency of this legislation. The measure of 
damages on condemnation of any such sign shall be limited to the 
replacement value of the materials used in construction of such 
signs."214 If payment of compensation is not constitutionally man-
dated and is provided only to comply with subsection (g) of title I 
of the federal Act, it is probable that the legislature may prescribe 
and limit the method of valuation to be applied, even though the 
form of an eminent domain proceeding is used. But in a state where 
it is held that the state constitution requires payment of compensation 
when lawfully erected nonconforming signs are removed, it is at least 
arguable that the legislature cannot constitutionally restrict the exer-
cise of the judicial function by prescribing a particular method of 
valuation in eminent domain proceedings to the exclusion of other 
judicially sanctioned methods.215 
In contrast to the Florida law, the Georgia statute requires pay-
ment of "the actual financial loss suffered by the lessee under a written 
preclude removal of nonconforming advertising signs unless and until federal matching 
funds are available under title I, subsection (g). See, e.g., CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 120· 
5-28(4) (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 1122(b)(2) (Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE § 
40-2830 (Supp. 1972); !LL. ANN. STAT. tit. 121, § 509 (Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. 
§ 36-3513 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2242 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 173.25 
(Supp. 1973); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 226.570(1)-(2) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. HWY. LAW § 88(7) 
(McKinney Supp. 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 24-17-05 (1970); OHIO R.Ev. CODE ANN. 
§ 5516.07 (Page Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1283 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.109(d) (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. 54-2608(b) (Supp. 1972); 
WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.105 (Supp. 1972). 
CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 5417 (West Supp. 1973), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 336 
(Supp. 1972), provide, in substance, that no compensation is to be paid upon removal of 
nonconforming signs unless and to the extent that such payment is required by federal 
law as a condition for payment to the state of a full share of federal highway funds. 
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 479.24(1) (Supp. 1972). 
214. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 479.24(5) (Supp. 1972). 
215. Courts have generally sanctioned use of the "comparable sales" and "income" 
methods of valuation, as well as the "cost" method, and have ordinarily rejected the 
view that any one method must be used to the exclusion of the others. 
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lease expressly and solely permitting the erection and maintenance of 
a sign ... (which was lawful on the date such lease was executed)," 
even if the sign was never in fact erected because the State Highway 
Department refused to issue a permit for its erection.216 The Georgia 
statute thus recognizes the lease itself as a kind of lawful nonconform-
ing use and requires payment of compensation when the lease is 
rendered valueless because the enactment of the compliance law 
precluded erection of a sign at the lease site. But it seems clear that 
such payments are not eligible for federal participation under title 
I, subsection (g) of the Highway Beautification Act,217 and this fact 
is likely to cause serious difficulties since another provision of the 
Georgia statute prohibits the State Highway Department "from pay-
ing more than 25 per cent of any award for just compensation."218 
Moreover, the prohibition in the Georgia compliance law against 
payment of any compensation "for any leasehold interest to land more 
than 100 feet from the public highway right-of-way"219 is clearly in-
consistent with title I, subsection (g), unless the prohibition is con-
strued to apply only to the additional compensation provided for 
lessees and lessors unable to obtain a permit for the erection of a sign. 
The Maine statute authorizes payment of compensation when the 
immediate removal of nonconforming signs is required, but 
when immediate removal of nonconforming advertising signs is not 
required but removal via regulation over an extended period of time 
is satisfactory, the [state highway] commission is authorized to use the 
police power of the State to establish a reasonable amortization period 
which will be long enough to allow recoupment of the capital invest-
ment which these nonconforming signs represent but which contem-
plates that at the end of this period the nonconforming sign will be 
removed by the owner without compensation.220 
The New Hampshire statute provides that "[i]n calculating just com-
216. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 95-2012a(c)-(d) (1972). Both subsections (c) and (d) contain 
the proviso "that the amount of compensation paid may not exceed the pro rata part 
of the entire rental paid and to be paid under such leases for the unelapsed portion 
thereof remaining on the effective date of this Chapter." 
217. The title I, subsection (g) requirement of payment of just compensation ap-
plies only "upon the removal of ••• outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices," 
and the federal share of the required just compensation is to be paid only for the 
taking of the property rights of "the owner of such sign, display, or device" and "the 
owner of the real property on which the sign, display, or device is located." 23 U.S.C. 
§ 13l(g) (1970). This clearly precludes any federal participation where only lease rights, 
unconnected with an actual sign located on a particular tract of land, are compen-
sated. 
218. GA. CoDE ANN. § 95-20lla (1972). 
219. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 95-2012a(c),(d) (1972). 
220. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2719(7) (Supp. 1972). 
1344 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1295 
pensation to be paid to the owner of an advertising device to be re-
moved by reason of nonconformity ... after January I, 1975, it is 
intended that the five year period of nonconforming use shall be 
considered as whole or partial compensation to said owner for his 
loss."221 
If the Maine and New Hampshire statutory provisions are con-
strued simply to mean that depreciation is to be taken into account 
in determining the value of a nonconforming sign at the time of its 
removal, there is no problem. But if these provisions are construed 
to mean that the "value" of a sign may be reduced in accordance with 
a schedule that bears no relation to the actual depreciation and that 
the period of non-conforming use may be considered to be the full 
compensation to which the owner of the sign is entitled even though 
the sign still has actual value at the time of removal, they are clearly 
inconsistent with the mandate of title I, subsection (g) for payment 
of just compensation. Since the Federal Highway Administration 
now regards both the Maine and New Hampshire statutes as comply-
ing with title I, it has apparently adopted the first construction. 
Washington, which, in 1961, adopted legislation to implement 
the bonus provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 by pro-
viding for the elimination of nonconforming billboards through the 
use of the police power,222 has provided in its compliance law under 
the Highway Beautification Act that no compensation shall be paid 
for signs "which became subject to removal pursuant to" the 1961 
legislation "prior to May 10, 1971."223 This provision would clearly 
be consistent with title I of the Highway Beautification Act if it ex-
empted from the compensation requirement only those signs that 
became unlawful and subject to removal under the 1961 Washington 
billboard legislation prior to October 22, 1965, the date of the enact-
ment of the Highway Beautification Act. If that were the case, indeed, 
the provision would simply codify the holding in Markham Advertis-
221. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 249A-ll(VI) (Supp. 1972). The following language ap• 
pears immediately after the provision quoted in the text: · 
It is further intended that, in calculating just compensation to the owner of the 
land for which rental compensation has been paid for the five preceding years, 
such rental income during the period of nonconforming use be taken into con-
sideration as whole or partial compensation. If funds become available, the com-
missioner of public works and highways is authorized to negotiate the removal 
of advertising devices prior to the end of the five-year period and is authorized 
to pay just compensation. 
222. Ch. 96, [1961] Wash. Laws 1575, as amended, ch. 3, § 55, [1963] Wash. Laws 
Extraordinary Sess. 1323, as amended, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 47.42.100 (Supp. 1972). 
223. WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.102(3) (Supp. 1972). 
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ing Co. v. State224 that title I does not require that compensation be 
paid upon the removal, pursuant to the 1961 legislation, of signs that 
became unlawful and subject to removal on March 11, 1964 (signs not 
located in areas zoned commercial or industrial), or on March 11, 
1965 (signs located in areas zoned commercial or industrial). But the 
exemption from the compensation requirement of all signs, if any, 
that became subject to removal, pursuant to the 1961 legislation, 
"prior to May 10, 1971," seems inconsistent with title I. This con-
clusion follows not only from the language of title I, subsection 
(g)(l)-(3), but even more clearly from the final sentence in subsection 
(j), which expressly states that the provisions of that subsection re-
lating to continuation of bonus payments under the 1958 Federal-Aid 
Highway Act "shall not be construed to exempt any State from con-
trolling outdoor advertising as otherwise provided in [title I]." 
Perhaps the strangest statutory treatment of the just compensa-
tion requirement is to be found in the Michigan compliance law. 
Although the statute clearly implies that off-premises signs not located 
in commercial or industrial areas "may be removed" by the state 
highway department, the section dealing with just compensation 
requires that compensation be paid only "upon the removal ... of 
any sign or sign structure lawfully in existence on the effective date 
of this act but which does not comply with the requirements of sec-
tions 15, 16 and 17 and any sign or sign structure lawfully erected 
after the effective date of this act but which thereafter becomes un-
lawful because of a change in the designation of the highway or in 
the zoning of the area in which it is located."225 Since sections 15, 16, 
and 17 of the Michigan statute relate only to standards for size, light-
ing, and spacing of signs in commercial or industrial areas,226 the 
Michigan statute does not expressly require payment of any compen-
sation upon the removal of off-premises signs lawfully in existence on 
the effective date of the act in areas other than commercial or indus-
trial areas; these are illegal simply by virtue of section 13 of the 
statute.227 In view of this strange omission it is hard to see how the 
Michigan statute can be deemed to be in compliance with title I 
of the Highway Beautification Act, although the Federal Highway 
Administration has found that it complies.228 
22·1-. 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969). 
See text accompanying notes 70·84 supra. 
225. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 252.322 (Supp. 1973). 
226. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 252.315-.317 (Supp. 1973). 
227. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 252.313 (Supp. 1973). 
228. See 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 15. 
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The Michigan statute, which is in many other respects poorly 
drafted, also leaves in doubt the status of advertising signs that were 
unlawfully erected between September 14, 1966, the effective date 
of an earlier compliance law,229 and March 31, 1972, the effective date 
of the current compliance law.230 No attempt was made to enforce the 
police power prohibition against erection of new off-premises bill-
boards in areas other than commercial and industrial areas after 
September 14, 1966; in fact, a very large number of new, "illegal" 
billboards were erected. Since the current compliance law repeals 
the earlier law but makes no express reference to billboards erected 
in violation of the earlier statute, it is impossible to be sure whether 
such billboards are to be deemed "lawfully in existence on the effec-
tive date of" the current statute. The Michigan billboard industry, 
as might be expected, has taken the position that the billboards are 
to be regarded as "lawfully in existence." Of course, if the current 
Michigan statute is literally construed as not requiring payment of 
compensation upon removal of such signs, even though lawfully in 
existence on its effective date, the issue becomes unimportant. 
E. Constitutionality of the State Legislation 
I. Police Power Controls 
All the current state outdoor advertising control laws rely on the 
police power in some measure to control the erection and mainte-
nance of signs within specified areas adjacent to various types of high-
ways. A determination that a given regulation is a valid police power 
measure ipso facto establishes that it is not a taking of private prop-
erty for public use that gives rise to a constitutional right of just 
compensation. The case law dealing with the regulation of outdoor 
advertising is now extensive enough to justify the conclusion that 
state laws prohibiting erection of new advertising signs within spe-
cified areas adjacent to public highways are constitutionally valid even 
if they make no provision for compensating landowners for the loss 
of the right to devote their land to advertising uses. 
The business of outdoor advertising on a commercial basis dates 
from the 1880's. Under the common law, advertising posters that for 
any reason were regarded as offensive or dangerous were dealt with 
under the doctrine of nuisance. From the 1890's onward, however, 
large-scale commercial promotion of billboard advertising became 
229. No. 333, [1966] Mich. Acts 613. 
230. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 252.301-.324 (Supp. 1973). 
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so aggTessive and its methods so -crude as to provoke prohibitory legis-
lation, usually in the form of municipal ordinances.231 
In the early cases the courts were generally hostile to these pro-
hibitory ordinances, and numerous billboard ordinances were de-
clared unconstitutional. The courts said that billboards were not 
nuisances in fact and could not be made so by legislative fiat. Aesthetic 
considerations were held insufficient to support use of the police 
power to impose rather modest restrictions upon the location of bill-
boards.232 Even ordinances with the limited purpose of protecting 
the appearance of public parks and boulevards by restricting the 
placing of billboards near such places were disapproved.233 The ra-
tionale of many of these early court decisions was stated by a con-
servative New Jersey court as follows: "Aesthetic considerations are 
a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is 
necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to 
take private property without compensation."234 
Even in the early 1900's, however, cases may be found upholding 
the validity of municipal billboard regulation on the dual grounds 
of safety and amenity.235 The decision generally credited with having 
the greatest influence in changing judicial attitudes toward billboard 
regulation is St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. 
Louis.236 In an opinion covering 124 pages, the Missouri court dis-
cussed the evolution of the law up to that time and upheld a munici-
pal ordinance regulating the size, height, and location of billboards. 
In an oft-quoted passage, the court said: 
231. See generally Proffitt, Public Esthetics and the Billboard, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 
l!H (1931); Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations, 25 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1926). 
232. E.g., Anderson v. Shackleford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 S. 343 (1917), overruled in part 
on other grounds, Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Common-
wealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905), overruled by 
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 
N.E. 799 (1935); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 
137 S.W. 929 (1911), dismissed per stipulation, 231 U.S. 761 (1913); Kansas City Gun-
ning Advertising Co. v. City of Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659, 144 S.W. 1099 (1912); Bill 
Posting Sign Co. v. City of Atlantic City, 71 N.J.L. 72, 58 A. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1904); City 
of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 
62 A. 267 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1905); State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (1908); 
Bryan v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 61 A. 894 (1905). 
233. Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 
920 (1911); Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 
(1905), overruled by General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 
289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935). 
234. City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 
N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905). 
235, See, e.g., In re Wilshire, 103 F. 620, 623-24 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1900). 
236, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), dismissed per stipulation, 231 U.S. 761 (1913). 
See also St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919). 
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[T]here is but one virtue connected with this entire [outdoor adver-
tising] business, and that is the advertising itself. This is a legitimate 
and honorable business, if honorably and legitimately conducted, 
but every other feature and incident thereto have evil tendencies, 
and should for that reason be strictly regulated and controlled. The 
signboards upon which this class of advertisements are displayed are 
constant menaces to the public safety and welfare of the city; they 
endanger the public health, promote immorality, constitute hiding 
places and retreats for criminals and all classes of miscreants. They 
are also inartistic and unsightly. 
In cases of fire they often cause their spread and constitute bar-
riers against their extinction; and in cases of high wind, their tem-
porary character, frail structure and broad surface, render them 
liable to be blown down and to fall upon and injure those who may 
happen to be in their vicinity. The evidence shows and common 
observation teaches us that the ground in the rear thereof is being 
constantly used as privies and the dumping ground for all kinds of 
waste and deleterious matters, and thereby creating public nuisances 
and jeopardizing public health; the evidence also shows that behind 
these obstructions the lowest form of prostitution and other acts of 
immorality are frequently carried on, almost under public gaze; tl1ey 
offer shelter and concealment for the criminal while lying in wait for 
his victim; and last, but not least, they obstruct the light, sunshine 
and air, which are so conducive to health and comfort.231 
Although the Missouri court, in the passage set out above, ex-
pressly mentioned the fact that signboards are "inartistic and un-
sightly," at a later point in its opinion it made it clear that, in its 
view, aesthetic considerations alone were insufficient to sustain the 
regulatory ordinance: 
As to the third class of cases, ... those which hold such ordinances 
invalid because they show upon their faces that they were enacted 
solely for aesthetic considerations and not for the good of the public, 
they are unquestionably sound; and no court should uphold an _ordi-
nance which has no better reason than that to commend it to the 
lawmaker and the courts. If the necessity or reasonableness of such an 
ordinance should be tested by such a standard, then the standard itself 
would be hard to establish, for the reason that all do not have the 
same tastes or ideas of beauty; what would please one might not 
please another .... A statute or ordinance conforming to the tastes 
and ideas of beauty passed [sic] by the body of lawmakers who enacted 
it might and probably would in most instances be distasteful to a 
majority of the people of the city; and especially is that true as re-
gards this class of legislation. . . . Property rights should never be 
subjected to such fickle standards of regulation, especially when they 
are devoid of all substantial benefit to the citizens.23B 
237. 235 Mo. at 144-45, 137 S.W. at 942. 
238. 235 Mo. at 202, 137 S.W. at 961. 
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The fact that the record of St. Louis Gunning and similar bill-
board cases supplied little evidence to support the health, safety, and 
morals justifications for regulatory legislation has been demonstrated 
by other ·writers.239 But many courts followed the lead of the Missouri 
court in upholding, on health, safety, and morals grounds, billboard 
regulations that were, in fact, primarily based on aesthetic grounds.240 
The rationale was widely employed even under circumstances that 
rendered its factual basis less convincing than it was in St. Louis 
Gunning.241 Nor was it discarded in later cases that exposed and gave 
substantial weight to the aesthetic considerations that were in large 
part the motivation for such regulatory legislation.242 
Growing appreciation of the close relationship between the value 
of property and the amenity of its surroundings had a significant 
practical effect on judicial views as to the scope of the police power. 
This relationship was noted when the United States Supreme Court, 
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,243 provided a solid consti-
tutional footing for comprehensive zoning and thus made available a 
natural framework for including outdoor advertising regulations in 
ordinances that regulated land use in other respects. The past sixty 
years have witnessed a gradual acceptance by the courts of a broader 
definition of general welfare than prevailed at the time of the St. 
Louis Gunning case. One aspect of this change in judicial attitude 
is the increasing number of opinions sustaining outdoor advertising 
controls that frankly expose their primary aesthetic purpose.244 Recent 
239. See, e.g., Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 
L\w &: CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955); Proffitt, supra note 231, at 151. 
240, See, e.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 344, 108 N.E. 340 
(1914), affd., 242 U.S. 526 (1917); People ex rel. Publicity Leasing Co. v. Ludwig, 218 
N.Y. 540, 113 N.E. 532 (1916); State v. Staples, 157 N.C. 637, 73 S.E. 112 (1911); Horton 
v. Old Colony Bill Posting Co., 36 R.I. 507, 90 A. 822 (1914); Cream City Bill Posting 
Co. v, City of Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 86, 147 N.W. 25 (1914). 
241. See, e.g., Whitmier &: Filbrick Co. v. City of Buffalo, 118 F. 773 (C.C.N.Y. 1902); 
Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Hav-A-Tampa Cigar 
Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 S.2d 433 (1941); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. 
Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 
U.S. 725 (1936); State v. Staples, 157 N.C. 637, 73 S.E. 112 (1911); Landau Advertising 
Co. v, Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 387 Pa. 552, 128 A.2d 559 (1957); Liggett's Petition, 
291 Pa. 109, 139 A. 619 (1927). 
242, E.g., National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 
27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962); Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 
(1944): General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 
193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936). 
243. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Supreme Court had previously held that billboards 
may be excluded from residence zones. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 
U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 
(1919). 
244. The rationale for basing billboard regulations on a broader concept of the 
general welfare that would include aesthetic factors was first stated in Churchill &: 
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cases sustaining aesthetic controls tend to rely at least in part on the 
ground that such controls promote the general welfare by preserving 
property values or valuable tourist attractions.245 A recent New Jersey 
Supreme Court opinion epitomized the aesthetic-property value ra-
tionale as follows: "There are areas in which aesthetics and economics 
coalesce, areas in which a discordant sight is as hard an economic fact 
as an annoying odor or sound. We refer not to some sensitive or ex-
quisite preference but to concepts of congruity held so widely that 
they are inseparable from the enjoyment and hence the value of 
property ."246 
The aesthetic-property value rationale is probably most persua-
sive when it is used to sustain municipal land use regulations (usually 
zoning regulations) that apply to urban areas247 or land use restric-
tions designed to maintain scenic beauty in areas that attract large 
numbers of tourists; it is least persuasive when used to sustain land 
use regulations in rural areas with little scenic value. But it is pretty 
clear that preservation of scenic beauty along highways, both to pro-
Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Philippines 580 (1915), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918). Other 
important cases include Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 
(1944); Merritt v. Peters, 65 S.2d 861 (Fla. 1953); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 
Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 
Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. 
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936); Crom• 
well v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); Perlmutter v. 
Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932); People v. Sterling, 128 Misc. 650, 220 N.Y.S. 
315 (Sup. Ct. 1927); State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923). 
See also State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968) Gunkyard); Oregon 
City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965) (auto wrecking yard). Cf. State ex rel. 
Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 S. 440 (1923). The broadest general 
welfare rationale for aesthetic regulation is provided by Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26 (1954). 
245. Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944) (billboards-
property values); Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960) (advertising 
signs-tourism); Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 S.2d 364 (1941) 
(exclusive hotel and apartment zone-aesthetic appeal, tourism); State ex rel. Civello v. 
City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 S. 440 (1923) (architectural control-property 
values); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955) 
(historic district, architectural control-tourism); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 
333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) (historic district, architectural control-tourism); 
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 198 A.2d 447 (1964) 
(outdoor advertising-property values); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 
272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (front-yard clothes lines-
property values); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp., v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 
69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (architectural controls-property 
values). 
246. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 
449 (1964). 
247. See, e.g., Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); 
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); 
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). 
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tect the right of the traveling public to aesthetic enjoyment and to 
preserve the tourist industry as an economic asset of the state, is a 
legitimate police power goal.248 And closely linked with use of the 
police power to preserve scenic beauty along highways is the idea that 
travelers on a public highway constructed with public funds have a 
right to be free from the intrusion of unwelcome advertising that 
derives its value to the advertiser entirely from the public investment 
in the highway.240 
Judicial recognition that the highway advertiser is essentially 
"seizing for private benefit an opportunity created for a quite differ-
ent purpose by the expenditure of public money in the construction 
of public ways"250 and that "the regulation of billboards and their 
restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a 
regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares"251 
led ultimately, in Kelbro) Inc. v. Myrick,252 to a holding that "the 
right of view [from the highway] of the owner or occupant of the 
abutting property is limited to such right as is appurtenant to that 
property and includes the right to display only goods or advertising 
matter pertaining to business conducted thereon."253 In addition, 
the growth in the number of automobiles on the highways and the 
increase in normal highway driving speeds has led to the development 
of a new public safety rationale for the regulation of outdoor adver-
tising-that regulation of highway advertising may reasonably be 
deemed to promote traffic safety, clearly a legitimate objective of 
police power regulations. 
All of the grounds mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs 
have been relied upon by the courts in decisions upholding the regu-
lation of outdoor advertising along the highways. These include a 
number of important recent decisions upholding the prohibition of 
off-premises advertising along interstate and other limited-access 
highways by statutes enacted in the early 1960's to take advantage 
2·!8. See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 
Mass. 149, 184-88, 193 N.E. 799, 815-17 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936). 
249. See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 
Mass. 149, 167-69, 193 N.E. 799, 808 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936). 
250. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub, Works, 289 Mass. 
149, 169, 193 N.E. 799, 808 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936). 
251. Churchill &: Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Philippines 580, 609 (1915), appeal dismissed, 
248 U.S. 591 (1918). 
252. 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943). 
253. 113 Vt. at 70, 30 A.2d at 530. See Wilson, supra note 94, for an exhaustive 
discussion of this "property rights" approach to outdoor advertising regulation. Kelbro 
was reaffirmed in Micalite Sign Corp. v. State Highway Dept., 126 Vt. 498, 236 A.2d 
680 (1967). 
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of the bonus provision of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958.254 
These cases have held the goals of legislation very similar to the cur-
rent compliance laws to be well within the police power, and all of 
them have sustained the statutes before the courts against attack on 
equal protection and free speech grounds. 
In dealing with the police power issue, all of these recent cases 
have relied upon both a traffic safety and an "aesthetic values" ra-
tionale. In addition, two cases relied in part upon the rationale of 
Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, discussed above.255 Since all of these cases 
involved statutes that provided for the removal of lawfully erected 
nonconforming advertising signs without compensation, they furnish 
very strong a fortiori support for use of the police power to prevent 
erection of new signs in controlled areas adjacent to interstate and 
primary highways. 
The distinction between off-premises and on-premises signs was 
expressly held to be valid in Opinion of the ]ustices206 and Ghaster 
Properties, Inc. v. Preston,251 against an attack on equal protection 
grounds, and has almost uniformly been sustained as reasonable in 
other cases.258 The distinction between interstate highways (and, in 
some cases, certain other limited-access highways) and other highways 
has been upheld in all the recent highway advertising cases.200 
Certain equal protection objections can be leveled against compli-
ance laws stimulated by the Highway Beautification Act that could 
not be asserted against the earlier state legislation sustained in the 
recent cases discussed above. For example, it can be argued that the 
compliance laws discriminate arbitrarily between rural and urban 
signs-and hence between roadside business advertising and standard-
ized outdoor advertising-because off-premises advertising is allowed 
254. Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 
268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Ct., Inc., 
10 N.Y,2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. 
Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 
73 Wash. 2d 405, 429 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969). 
255. See text accompanying notes 252-53 supra. 
256. 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961). 
257. 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964). 
258. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 417 
(1964); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 
(1952); Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943). Cf. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). Contra, Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sar~ota, 
122 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960). 
259. Similarly, the distinction between land within 660 feet of interstate highways 
(and other controlled highways) and land located farther from such highways has been 
sustained either by implication or, in one case, by express language. See Moore v. 
Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Ky. 1964). 
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only in zoned and unzoned commercial and business areas.260 It can 
also be argued that the regulation of advertising signs in areas adja-
cent to interstate and federal-aid primary highways but not in areas 
adjacent to federal-aid secondary highways or other highways involves 
an arbitrary discrimination. I believe it is very unlikely, however, 
that state laws enacted to comply with the Highway Beautification 
Act will be held invalid on the basis of such equal protection 
arguments. 
There would appear to be a rational basis for the separate classifi-
cation261 of zoned and unzoned commercial or industrial areas, on the 
one hand, and all other areas, on the other, at least to the extent that 
aesthetic considerations are deemed a proper basis for regulation of 
highway advertising. It is obvious that, in general, few aesthetic fea-
tures will be found in zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial 
areas, while rural and residential areas are more likely to include 
places of scenic beauty and historic interest.262 Similarly, there would 
seem to be a rational basis for classifying interstate and federal-aid 
primary highways differently than federal-aid secondary highways and 
other highways. Interstate highways, as a class, carry more high-speed 
traffic than any other class of highways, so the traffic safety rationale 
for regulation of outdoor advertising along these highways is particu-
larly persuasive. It also seems clear that the federal-aid primary sys-
tem, which by statute "shall consist of an adequate system of con-
nected main highways, selected or designated by each State,"263 can 
reasonably be given a separate classification on the ground that these 
highways are more heavily traveled than federal-aid secondary high-
ways or other state highways.264 
A further equal protection issue may arise because so many of the 
state compliance laws do not provide for payment of compensation 
upon removal of nonconforming signs lawfully erected in areas adja-
cent to existing interstate or federal-aid primary highways between 
260. Sec, e.g., 1967 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 215-18 (letter from Paul 
Spooner, General Counsel, Roadside Business Association, to members of tbe Sub-
committee on Roads, April 27, 1967). 
261. As tbe United States Supreme Court has held, equal protection of tbe laws 
"only requires tbat classification rest on real and not feigned differences, that tbe dis-
tinction have some relevance to the purpose for which tbe classification is made, and 
that tbe different treatments be not so disparate, relative to tbe difference in classi-
fication, as to be wholly arbitrary." Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954). 
262. See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 146-47 (colloquy between 
Rep. Cramer and Archibald C. Rogers, architect). 
263. 23 u.s.c. § 103(b) (1970). 
264. For tbe distinction between federal-aid primary and secondary systems, see 
23 U.S.C. §§ 103(b)-(c) (1970). 
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October 22, 1965, and January 1, 1968. As previously indicated,265 this 
omission results from the adoption in state compliance laws of the 
language of subsection (g) of title I of the Highway Beautification Act, 
but it obviously discriminates against owners of property interests in 
those signs and the realty upon which those signs are located. The 
only rational basis for this discrimination is the fact that, under sub-
section (g) of title I, no federal funds are available for compensation 
of the holders of such property interests, while the federal govern-
ment will contribute seventy-five per cent of the compensation re-
quired to be paid upon removal of nonconforming signs "(l) lawfully 
in existence on the date of enactment of this subsection [October 22, 
1965], (2) those lawfully on any highway made a part of the interstate 
or primary system on or after the date of enactment of this subsection 
and before January 1, 1968, and (3) those lawfully erected on or after 
January l, 1968."266 It is doubtful that this fact alone justifies the 
states in discriminating between property mvners otherwise similarly 
situated. The equal protection issue, however, is unlikely to arise if 
payment of compensation is required by federal or state courts on due 
process or "taking" grounds.26611 
Another possible equal protection problem should be mentioned 
here. The state compliance laws enacted in response to title I of the 
Highway Beautification Act all provide, broadly, for the prohibition 
of future advertising signs by means of the police power, without 
compensation to landowners for the loss of their right to erect signs in 
the future. However, landowners are to be compensated for the loss 
of present rights under existing advertising leases when existing signs 
are removed; in many (perhaps most) states, it is not clear whether the 
statutory compensation provisions will be construed to require pay-
ment of compensation to the landowner for loss of the right to erect 
future signs when an existing sign is removed.267 If the latter con-
struction is adopted, it can be argued that these compliance laws 
deny the equal protection of the laws in so far as they provide that 
some landowners will be compensated for the loss of a property right, 
while other landowners will not. 
265. See te.xt accompanying notes 176-77 supra. 
266. 23 u.s.c. § 131(g) (1970). 
266a. For an indication that uncompensated removal requirements may be consti• 
tutionally invalid on such grounds, see Art Neon Co. v. City &: County of Denver, 357 
F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973); State Highway Dept. v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 S.E.2d 
372 (1966). 
267. If state compliance laws are so construed, the problem presented will be sim-
ilar to the one discussed in D. SUTIE &: R. CUNNINGHAM, SCENIC EASEMENTS: LEGAL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND VALUATION PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES 45-46 (Highway Research 
Board, NCHRP Report No. 56, 1968). 
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Although there seems to be no judicial authority directly in point, 
several early zoning cases raised a similar problem. In these cases, 
zoning ordinances were attacked as unconstitutionally discriminatory 
because they permitted existing nonconforming uses to continue but 
prohibited the establishment of the same uses in the future by land-
owners similarly situated. As early as 1925, however, a California de-
cision, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, upheld a zoning 
ordinance that permitted existing uses to continue although they did 
not conform to the use restrictions of the district in which they were 
located.268 The court said that the ordinance was not invalid because 
it was not retroactive and permitted the continuance of existing non-
conforming uses. In 1927, the Tennessee Supreme Court also held 
that zoning ordinance provisions allowing continuance of existing 
nonconforming uses did not discriminate unfairly in favor of the non-
conforming user.269 Within the next decade, the courts of eight states 
reached the same conclusion.270 The courts have generally said that 
the distinction between existing and future uses of land is not arbi-
trary or unreasonable, has a rational basis,271 and affects in a similar 
manner all persons similarly situated.272 In short, it is reasonable to 
place in separate classes those landowners with existing nonconform-
ing uses on their land and those without such uses. In addition, the 
courts have said that a municipality can protect existing uses so that 
the zoning ordinance is not unnecessarily harsh and burdensome273 
and that it "would seem almost, if not quite, necessary" to include in 
zoning ordinances provisions allowing continuance of nonconforming 
uses.274 
These early zoning cases would seem, at least by analogy, to pro-
268. Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925), a/fd., 274 U.S. 
325 (1927). 
269. Spencer-Sturla Co. v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. '70, 290 S.W. 608 (1927). 
270. Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 228 N.W. 870 (1930); City of 
Norton v. Hutson, 142 Kan. 305, 46 P .2d 630 (1935); Sampere v. City of New Orleans, 
166 La. '776, 117 S. 827 (1928), affd. per curiam, 279 U.S. 812 (1929); Stone v. Cray, 89 
N.H. 483, 200 A. 517 (1938); City of Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 
78 (1931); Baxley v. City of Frederick, 133 Okla. 84, 271 P. 257 (1928); Huebner v. 
Philadelphia Sav. Fund Socy., 127 Pa. Super. 28, 192 A. 139 (1937); Lombardo v. City of 
Dallas, 47 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), a/fd., 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W .2d 475 (1934). 
271. See, e.g., Vendley v. City of Berkeley, 21 Ill. 2d 563, 566, 173 N.E.2d 506, 508 
(1961); Kinney v. Sutton, 230 N.C. 404, 411, 53 S.E.2d 306, 310 (1949). 
272. Sampere v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 776, 780, 117 S. 827, 828 (1928), affd. 
per curiam, 279 U.S. 812 (1928). 
273. State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 570, 114 S. 159, 161 (1927). 
274. Momeier v. John McAiister, Inc., 203 S.C. 353, 372, 27 S.E.2d 504, 511 (1943). 
A number of cases hold that attempts to eliminate nonconforming uses by means of 
the police power are unconstitutional. E.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 
295 P. 14 (19!10). 
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vide adequate authority to sustain the different treatment under state 
compliance laws of those landowners who have advertising signs on 
their land under existing leases and those who do not. Moreover, 
where advertising signs were erected before the compliance law be-
came effective, the value of the landowner's right to use his land for 
outdoor advertising has been factually demonstrated; where adver-
tising signs have not been erected by that date, the value of his right 
has not been factually demonstrated. This difference alone seems 
sufficient to justify a different classification for land on which lawful 
advertising signs have already been erected when the compliance law 
becomes effective.275 
2. Control by Means of the Spending Power 
and the Eminent Domain Power 
One question that immediately comes to mind is whether acquisi-
tion of nonconforming highway advertising signs and the associated 
property rights can be deemed to promote a public purpose and to 
result in a public use of the property acquired. This problem is im-
portant because (I) expenditure of public funds for other than public 
purposes is generally prohibited by state constitutions,276 (2) almost 
all state constitutions allow the taking of private property by eminent 
domain only for public use,277 and (3) a statute authorizing the taking 
275. Cf. D. SUTIE &: R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 267, at 46. 
276. Some state constitutions expressly prohibit expenditures of public funds or 
levying taxes for other than public purposes. See AI.As. CoNST. art. IX, § 6; HAWAII 
CONST. art. VI, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § l; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8; Mo. CONST. art. X, 
§ 3; MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 11; TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; WASH, CONST. art. VII, 
§ 1. Other state constitutions prohibit either a grant of public money or a loan of 
the state's credit to private individuals, associations, or corporations. See .ARIZ. CONST. 
art. 9, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 31; CoLO. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; Mo. CoNST. art. III, 
§ 38(a); NEV. CONST. art. 8, § 9 (purchase of stock of corporations, companies, associ-
ations prohibited); N.J. CoNST. art. VIII, § III, 11 3; N.M. CoNsr. art. IX, § 14; N.Y. 
CONST. art. VII, § 8; OKLA. CoNST. art. X, § 15. And many state constitutions simply 
prohibit the giving o_r lending of the state's credit to private individuals, associations, 
or corporations. See Ai.A. CONST. art. 4, § 93; ARK. CoNsr. art. 16, § l; FLA. CONST. 
art. 7, § 10; GA. CONST. art. VII, § III, 11 IV; IDAHO CoNsr. art. VIII, § 2; IOWA CONST. 
art. VII, § l; KY. CONST. § 177; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 14 (except for insuring industrial 
development mortgage loans); MD. CONST. art. III, § 34; MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 10; MISS. 
CoNST. art. 14, § 258; N.J. CONST. art. VIII,§ 2, 11 l; Omo CoNsr. art. VII,§ 4; PA. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 8; s.c. CONST. art. X, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 31; TEX. CONST. art. Ill, 
§ 50; UTAH CoNST. art. 6, § 31; VA. CONST. art. X, § 10 (except insuring industrial devel-
opment loans); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6; WIS. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 3; WYO. CoNST. art. XVI, § 6. Provisions of this third type, merely pro-
hibiting the giving or lending of the state's credit, have generally been construed to 
prohibit the expenditure of public funds for any nonpublic purpose. 
277. The federal constitution and all but three of the state constitutions contain 
provisions that have been construed to protect the owner of private property from an 
exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes that do not involve a public 
use. In some cases the state constitutions expressly forbid the taking of private prop-
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of private property for other than public use will violate the four-
teenth amendment's prohibition against deprivation of property with-
out due process of law.278 
There would appear to be at least two possible lines of attack on 
the public use issue. First, the courts can rely on cases like Berman v. 
Parker,219 which hold, in substance, that public use means simply 
public purpose or public benefit. This is essentially what the state 
courts have done in the many cases challenging state urban renewal 
enabling acts.280 In at least twenty-nine states, the courts, without the 
aid of special constitutional provisions, have sustained urban renewal 
statutes that authorize the use of eminent domain to acquire land 
and the resale of the land to private agencies for redevelopment in 
accordance with a publicly approved plan and subject to land-use 
restrictions designed to assure continued compliance with that 
plan.281 The courts of these states have, in effect, though not always 
in express terms, equated public use with substantial public pur-
pose. Although most of the cases emphasize the public purpose 
and public use (the terms are used interchangeably) involved in the 
clearance of slum and blighted areas,282 some cases also recognize that 
erty for private uses. In a majority of cases the negative implication of the conventional 
condemnation clause-that private property shall not be taken for public use without 
payment of just compensation-is used to protect the property owner from a taking 
for private use. Even in the three states that have no express constitutional provision 
as to eminent domain, it has been held that other constitutional provisions preclude 
the taking of private property for private use or without payment of just compensa-
tion. Moreover, most state constitutions contain a clause prohibiting the taking of 
property without due process of law, or equivalent provisions; in some instances the 
state courts have relied on these clauses in holding a taking for private use unconsti-
tutional, either because the state constitution did not contain the usual eminent do-
main clause or because the court was not satisfied with the implied prohibition 
contained in that clause. For a more extended discussion with citation of authorities, 
see 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 106, § 7.1. 
278. Hairston v. Danville &: W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598 (1908); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 
361 (1905). For discussion, see 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 106, § 4.7. 
279. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
280. See 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 106, § 7.51561 n.l, at 188-203, citing cases from 
36 states upholding urban renewal enabling acts. For a similar list of cases from 31 
jurisdictions upholding such acts, with a useful classification of the cases, see the appen-
dix to Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 393-95, 378 P.2d 464, 475-77 (1963). 
281. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mis~issippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. The 
only state that is still clearly contra is South Carolina. See 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 
106, § 7.51561 n.1, at 188-203. 
282. See, e.g., Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 128-29, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25 (1945). 
All the state court decisions on the constitutionality of urban renewal acts au-
thorizing the exercise of the eminent domain power have been significantly influenced 
by Lhe United States Supreme Court's opinion in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), 
discussed in tc.xt accompanying note 279 supra. 
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resale of urban renewal project land subject to restrictions that limit 
its future use to publicly authorized purposes creates a kind of con-
tinuing public use of the land.283 The parallel with a highway adver-
tising control program is clear, since the essence of such a program is 
restriction of the use of privately owned land to achieve a purpose 
declared by the legislature to be a public purpose. Indeed, the urban 
renewal cases actually go further than is necessary to sustain a high-
way advertising control program, since the latter does not involve the 
resale of land for what is clearly private use in the ordinary sense of 
the term. 
Second, since the purpose of the highway advertising control pro-
gram is, in part at least, identical to the purpose of the scenic ease-
ment acquisition program, and the restrictions against advertising 
use to be imposed under the advertising control program are essen-
tially similar to scenic easements (though more limited in scope), 
state courts could simply follow the holding in Kamrowski v. State281 
that "[t]he enjoyment of the scenic beauty by the public which passes 
along the highway" is "a direct use by the public of the rights in land 
which have been taken in the form of a scenic easement."285 
Assuming that the issue of public use is resolved on the Berman 
theory, the question of public purpose or public benefit still remains. 
It seems clear that acquisition of highway advertising signs and the 
associated rights of sign owners and landowners will be held to be for 
a public purpose and to produce a public benefit in any state where 
the courts have accepted aesthetic zoning as a valid exercise of the 
police power, since the cases supporting aesthetic zoning are based on 
judicial recognition of the fact that the preservation of aesthetic 
values is an appropriate goal of governmental action.286 And, if 
police-power regulation, without compensation, is an appropriate 
means of achieving this governmental objective, then a fortiori the 
expenditure of public funds and the use of the eminent domain 
power are appropriate where nonconforming highway signs and the 
associated property rights must be acquired by the state. Indeed, the 
acquisition of such signs and the associated rights is likely to be held 
to involve a public purpose and to produce a public benefit in many 
states where aesthetic zoning has not yet been fully accepted, since 
283. See, e.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 143•44, 104 A.2d 
365, 369-70 (1954). 
284. 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966). 
285. 31 Wis. 2d at 265, 142 N.W.2d at 797. 
286. See· text accompanying notes 244-46 supra. 
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there are many cases in these states directly upholding the control of 
highway advertising under the police power.287 Moreover, as the 
states shift from the uncompensated control of land use under the 
police power to acquisition of nonconforming signs and related 
property rights by means of eminent domain, with payment of just 
compensation, it becomes much less necessary for courts to oversee 
the legislative or administrative definition of "beauty" or "scenic" 
-a problem of definition that underlies much of the judicial reluc-
tance to accept aesthetic zoning as a valid exercise of the police 
power.288 In any case, the traffic safety rationale of highway advertis-
ing control is almost certainly adequate to satisfy the public purpose 
requirement. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that in all, or 
almost all, states the acquisition of nonconforming highway signs and 
the associated property rights of both the sign owners and the land-
owners pursuant to state advertising control laws will be held (if chal-
lenged in the courts) to involve both a public use and a public pur-
pose sufficient to justify the expenditure of public funds and the use 
of the power of eminent domain. 
3. State Contitutional "Antidiversion" 
Provisions 
Assuming that the acquisition of nonconforming highway signs 
and the associated property rights by means of eminent domain and 
the use of public funds to pay just compensation therefor are con-
stitutionally justifiable under the public use and public purpose 
tests, there remains in many states the question whether it is lawful 
for a state highway agency to use dedicated highway funds to pay the 
state's twenty-five per cent share of the just compensation required by 
title I of the Highway Beautification Act. 
Some twenty-eight states have constitutional provisions that ear-
mark certain state revenues-typically the motor fuel excise taxes 
and the vehicle registration fees-for specified highway purposes.283 
These provisions are generally known as "antidiversion amendments" 
and have prevented highway user taxes from being appropriated for 
287. See text accompanying notes 235-42, 248-55 supra. 
288. "Whatever may be the law with respect to zoning restrictions based upon 
aesthetic considerations, a stronger argument can be made in support of the power 
to take property, in return for just compensation, in order to fulfill aesthetic concepts, 
than for the imposition of police power restrictions for such purposes." Kamrowski v. 
State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 265-66, 142 N.W.2d 793, 797 (1966). 
289. The provisions are as follows: ALA. CoNsr. amend. 93; ARiz. CoNsr. art. 9, 
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the support of governmental programs that have nothing to do with 
highways and thus confer no benefit on the highway user qua high-
way user. Although the forces that were originally mobilized in the 
1920's to promote these amendments were, and still are, energetic in 
their efforts, they were not able to secure uniformity of language in 
the amendments that were adopted. As a result, each state legislature 
that faces the problem of squaring its highway advertising control 
program with its state constitution must look carefully to the wording 
of the antidiversion amendment in its own constitution. 
All the amendments, naturally, are chiefly concerned with direct-
ing highway user funds into road construction and maintenance. The 
most liberal simply specify "highway purposes,"290 "highway purposes 
as defined by Iaw,"291 or the creation of a special highway fund292 or 
add "other statutory highway purposes" to the list of specified high-
way purposes.293 In these states it seems clear that the legislature, by 
designating the acquisition of nonconforming signs and associated 
property rights as a "highway purpose," can make dedicated highway 
funds available for acquisition of signs and associated rights if it 
wishes. Many of the current highway advertising control laws contain 
such a designation. 
A few states have other general language in their antidiversion 
amendments that could be interpreted to permit the use of highway 
user funds for billboard acquisition. For example, the California and 
Utah provisions speak of "construction, improvement, repair and 
maintenance of highways."294 Georgia's provision refers to "all activ-
§ 14; CAL. CoNST, art. 26; CoLO. CoNST. art. X, § 18; GA. CONST, art. VII, § IX, 1 IV(b); 
IDAHO CoNST. art. VII, § 17; IOWA CONST. art. VII, § 8; KAN. CONST. art. 11, § IO; KY. 
CONST. § 230; LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 22-23; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 19; MASS. CONST. amend. 
LXXIII; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 9; MINN. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 9, 10; Mo. CoNST, art. 
IV, § 30(b); MONT. CONST. art. XII, § l(b); NEV. CONST. art. 9, § 5; N.H. CONST. pt. II, 
art. 6-a; N.D. CONST. amend. 56; OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 5a; ORE. CONST, art. IX, § S; 
PA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 11; S.D. CoNsr. art. XI, § 8; TEX. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 7-a; UTAH 
CoNsr. art. 13, § 13; WASH. CoNsr. art. II,§ 40; w. VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 52; WYO. CONST. 
art. XV, § 16. 
290. KAN. CoNsr. art. 11, § 10. 
291. MrcH. CONST. art. IX, § 9. 
292. LA. CoNsr. art. VI, § 23. 
293. Omo CoNST. art. XII, § 5(a). 
294. CAL. CONST. art. 26; UTAH CONST. art. 13, § 13. (Emphasis added.) The Mis• 
souri provision similarly authorizes use of dedicated highway funds to complete, widen 
or improve the state highway system, and also for "such other purposes and contin-
gencies relating ••• to the construction and maintenance of such highways ••• as the 
commission may deem necessary and proper." Mo. CoNST. art. IV, § 30(b) (emphasis 
added). 
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ities incident to providing and maintaining an adequate system of 
public highways."295 And Washington's provision speaks of "construc-
tion, reconstruction, repair and betterment of public highways."296 
In many states, the antidiversion amendments simply prescribe in 
substance that the "construction, reconstruction, maintenance and 
repair" of highways are the only permissible uses of highway user 
funds.207 Even under such amendments, however, it would seem 
that highway user funds could be properly expended for acquisition 
of nonconforming highway signs and the associated rights if the en-
abling legislation expressly states that such acquisition may be deemed 
to constitute "a part of the establishment, construction, or reconstruc-
tion of State highways on the Federal-aid Highway System"298 or that 
"[!]and, or any interest therein, acquired under ... this act is hereby 
declared to be part of the adjacent or nearest highway.''299 
Up until the late 1950's there was practically no case law inter-
preting the antidiversion amendments. Following the authorization 
by Congress in 1956300 of the use of federal-aid highway funds to re-
imburse the states for ninety per cent of the cost of relocating utility 
facilities away from highway rights-of-way, however, there was a rash 
of state legislation designed to liberalize existing state limitations on 
payments of this type. In those states with constitutional antidiversion 
provisions where the constitutionality of making utility relocation 
payments from the highway trust funds has been litigated, the deci-
sions are divided, but a majority has sustained the legislation and has 
expressly held that such payments do not violate the constitutional 
provisions. 301 
Even more significant is the decision in Newman v. Hjelle,802 sus-
taining the use of highway trust funds to purchase highway advertis-
295. GA. CoNST, art. VII, § IX, ,r IV(b). 
296. WASH. CONST. art. II,§ 40 (emphasis added). 
297. This is the case in Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. 
298. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-413.I (Supp. 1966). 
299. UTAH CODE ANN, § 27-12-109.3 (Supp. 1967). 
300. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, § 111, 70 Stat. 383 (codified 
at 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1970)). 
301. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn. 164, 91 N.W .2d 642 (1958); Jones 
v. Burns, 138 Mont. 268, 357 P.2d 22 (1960); Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 527, 132 
A.2d 613 (1957); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1960); State 
v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W .2d 737 (1960). 
302, 133 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 1965). 
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ing rights in connection with the bonus provisions of the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1958. The diversion issue was squarely raised in New-
man by the plaintiff's attempt to enjoin the state's use of revenue from 
motor fuel taxes and vehicle license and registration fees for the pur-
chase of advertising rights. The opinion of the court carefully traced 
the history of the North Dakota antidiversion amendment and con-
cluded by saying: 
It is clear the purpose of the amendment was to prevent any use 
of the earmarked revenues for anything but highway purposes and 
not to restrict the terms of the amendment by a narrow construction 
of the purpose for which the revenue may be used within the area 
designated. 
In view of this history and statutes in effect at the time the con-
stitutional amendment was voted upon, it is clear that the people 
intended .•. to make the scope broad enough to include such matters 
as were considered within the area of the powers of the State Highway 
Department, as those powers may exist in relation to public highways. 
We find this included the right to control advertising signs, billboards, 
and other signs erected on the right of way, as well as on lands abut-
ting thereon, if such control was provided by law.303 
303. 133 N.W.2d at 557-58. In 1963, the Attorneys General of North and South Dakota 
were asked to render opinions on the constitutionality of proposals that would have au-
thorized the state highway departments to enter into agreements with the Secretary of 
Commerce under the 1958 federal-aid legislation providing for billboard control along 
the interstate system. 
South Dakota's Attorney General was of the opinion that use of dedicated highway 
funds to purchase outdoor advertising rights would violate the state constitutional 
provision that requires that such funds be spent "e.xclusively for the maintenance, con-
struction and supervision" of highways and bridges. In passing, he distinguished the 
use of highway funds to pay for the relocation of utilities from the highway right-of-way 
by noting that no vested property rights were disturbed by relocation and that it was 
merely incident to actual highway contsruction. See 1963-64 S.D. ATrY. GEN, REP. 34. 
Shortly after the South Dakota opinion was issued, the Attorney General of North 
Dakota issued his opinion. He noted that North Dakota's constitution limits the use of 
dedicated highway funds to "construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of 
public highways"-a limitation that he felt was even tighter than South Dakota's, which 
also mentions "supervision." He also noted North Dakota's legislation providing for 
payment of utility relocation costs and cited the North Dakota court's approval of that 
law on the ground that "'construction' embraces everything appropriately connected 
with and necessarily incidental to the complete accomplishment of the general purpose 
for which the fund exists." However, the Attorney General found no authority for re-
garding the acquisition of outdoor advertising rights, either in the form of additional 
right-of-way or rights in land adjacent to the right-of-way, to be part of highway "con-
struction." Instead, he viewed control of roadside advertising as an independent project 
and expressed "serious doubts" that dedicated highway funds could lawfully be spent 
for this purpose. See 1962-64 N.D. Am. GEN. REP. 148. 
Two years later, however, the Attorney General of North Dakota was compelled to 
argue in support of the state's program of billboard control through purchase of adver-
tising rights and, in Newman v. Hjelle, succeeded in convincing the court that this prac-
tice should be sustained. 
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Although the case law dealing with the antidiversion amendments 
is certainly not conclusive, on the whole it gives reason to believe that 
these amendments will generally not be construed so narrowly as to 
preclude the use of dedicated highway funds for the acquisition of 
nonconforming highway signs and the associated property rights of 
sign owners and landowners. 
Ill. CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION 
Although the advertising control provisions of the Highway Beau-
tification Act of 1965 have been the subject of unremitting contro-
versy from the date of enactment until the present time, only three 
substantive amendments to title I have been adopted in the inter-
vening years. These are the amendments to subsections ( d)304 and 
(j)305 and the addition of a new subsection (n),306 all of which were 
adopted in 1968.807 
In 1969, several abortive attempts were made to amend title I 
further. A Senate bi11308 would have authorized the Secretary to enter 
into agreements with one or more states for the purpose of carrying 
out pilot programs to determine the best means of accomplishing the 
objectives of title I and would have appropriated fifteen million dol-
lars for such programs. The legislative history of the bill clearly indi-
cates that it was primarily designed to allow Utah to proceed with 
removal of nonconforming billboards pursuant to the "Snarr plan."809 
The 1969 House bill310 would have (1) changed the deadline for com-
pliance with subsection (b) of title I from January 1, 1968, to January 
1, 1971,311 (2) appropriated a mere 1.5 million dollars for highway 
304. See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
305. See note 16 supra. 
306. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra. 
307. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, §§ 6(a)-(b),(d), 82 Stat. 817. 
308. S. 1442, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
309. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 51-60 (testimony of Douglas T. 
Snarr); 1969 House Hearings, supra note 43, at 185-90. See also 1969 Senate Hearings, 
supra, at 4-51 (testimony and statements of Senator Frank E. Moss, Henry C. Helland, 
Larry Wimmer, and F. John Francis); 1969 House Hearings, supra, at 161-84 (testimony 
and statements of Henry C. Helland, Merrill Bateman, and F. John Francis). 
In substance, the "Snarr plan" envisaged thl!t the state highway agencies would buy, 
and each advertising company would sell, all nonconforming signs within a given state 
pursuant to a single contract negotiated by the state and the company instead of re-
quiring the state agency to buy or condemn nonconforming signs one at a time. For a 
more detailed description, see R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 42, at 62. 
310. H.R. 14741, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
311. H.R. 14741, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969). 
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beautification programs in fiscal 1971,312 and (3) required the Secre-
tary, in cooperation with the state highway departments, to "make a 
full and complete investigation and study of how such programs 
should be carried out to effectively provide the desired public and 
private benefits and submit to Congress a report based on such in-
vestigation and study, including his recommendations, not later than 
April 15, 1970."313 
Neither bill became law, but the Department of Transportation 
nevertheless conducted a new study of the problems arising under 
title I and issued a report in June 1970.314 A bill encompassing its 
recommendations was introduced in the Senate on July 1, 1970,m 
and another bill with the same provisions ~s the abortive 1969 Senate 
bill was introduced on August 18, 1970.316 However, neither of these 
was enacted by Congress. Ultimately, Congress included in the Fed-
eral-Aid Highway Act of 1970317 a provision creating an eleven-mem-
ber Commission on Highway Beautification,318 to be composed of two 
majority and two minority members from each of the two congres-
sional Public Works Committees and three members to be appointed 
by the President "from among persons who are not officers or em-
ployees of the United States."319 
Although the authorizing legislation provided that the Commis-
sion should make a final report not later than one year after it was 
312. H.R. 14741, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969). 
313. H.R. 14741, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969). 
314. HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 9lsr. CONG., 2D SESS., R.EsrUDY OF THE HIGHWAY 
BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM (Comm. Print 1970). 
315. S. 4055, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 108 (1970). 
316. S. 4260, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 113 (1970). 
317. Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.). 
318. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 123, 84 Stat. 1727. 
The Commission of Highway Beautification is charged to 
(1) study existing statutes and regulations governing the control of outdoor adver-
tising and junkyards in areas adjacent to the Federal-aid highway system; (2) review 
the policies and practices of the Federal and State agencies charged with administra-
tive jurisdiction over such highways insofar as such policies and practices relate 
to governing the control of outdoor advertising and junkyards; (3) compile data 
necessary to understand and determine the requirements for such control which 
may now exist or are likely to exist within the foreseeable future; (4) study prob-
lems relating to the control of on-premise outdoor advertising signs, promotional 
signs, directional signs, and signs providing information that i$ essential to the 
motoring public; (5) study methods of financing and possible sources of Federal 
funds, including use of the Highway Trust Fund, to carry out a highway beautifica-
tion program; and (6) recommend such modifications or additions to existing laws, 
regulations, policies, practices, and demonstration programs as will, in the judgment 
of the Commission, achieve a workable and effective highway beautification program 
and best serve the public interest. 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-605, § 123(h), 84 Stat. 1727. 
319. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 123(b), 84 Stat. 1727. 
June 1973] Billboard Control 1365 
funded320 (August 1971), for various reasons the Commission did not 
become fully operational until December 1971.821 The Commission 
then held public hearings throughout the country and amassed a con-
siderable amount of data and information about highway beautifica-
tion. In the latter part of 1972, it prepared an interim report recom-
mending certain statutory amendments and requesting an extension 
of time to enable it to complete a number of investigations relating, 
inter alia, to (1) the reconsideration of agreements where there is dis-
satisfaction with terms on such matters as definition of unzoned com-
mercial areas, interchanges, and spacing; (2) examination of methods 
of getting information to motorists efficiently and in a manner consis-
tent with highway beautification, including implementation of pilot 
projects on official information centers and radio transmissions; (3) 
methods for calculating compensation for sign removals and the effect 
of such compensation on state and local sign control programs; (4) the 
clarification of the effective date of controls imposed by the Highway 
Beautification Act of 1965; (5) the clarification, and possible modifi-
cation, of the relationship of controls under the 1958 Bonus Act to 
controls under the 1965 Highway Beautification Act; (6) revisions in 
the Secretary of Transportation's authority to impose a ten per cent 
penalty for failure to comply with federal requirements for highway 
beautification; (7) the clarification of the legality of federal participa-
tion in certain payments made under laws covering outdoor advertis-
ing; (8) modifications in state-local relationships in sign control pro-
grams; (9) the feasibility of Highway Corridor Boards in sign control 
programs, zoning, and other land use planning; (10) the relationship 
of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act to compensation paid un-
der a state's laws enacted to comply with the Highway Beautification 
Act; (11) the development of scenic routes; and (12) relative priorities 
in the highway beautification program.822 
A provision for the extension of the date for completion of the 
Commission's work to December 31, 1973, was embodied in both the 
Senate and House versions of the ill-fated Federal-Aid Highway Act 
of 1972.828 However, in the current session of the Congress, the issue 
320. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91--605, § 123(i), 84 Stat. 1727. 
321. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 13. 
322. The interim report has not been published, but copies may be obtained from 
the Commission on Highway Beautification, 1121 Vermont Ave., N.W., Washington, 
D.C.20005. 
323. S. 3939, § 146(a), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CoNG. R.Ec. S15336 
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 133(a), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 
118 CoNG, R.Ec. H9300 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). 
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of the continuation of the Commission was separated from other 
highway legislation, and a joint resolution was passed extending the 
Commission's life until December 31, 1973.324 
The unenacted Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972 also contained 
several proposed amendments to title I of the Highway Beautification 
Act of 1965. Both the Senate and House versions of the Act would 
have amended subsection (m) of title I to authorize the expenditure 
of 50 million dollars in each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975 for the 
removal of nonconforming advertising signs, 325 and both versions 
would have required the states to purchase all nonconforming signs 
voluntarily offered by the owner for removal if federal funds were 
available.326 Both versions would have amended subsection (b) to ex-
tend highway advertising controls beyond the present 660 feet from 
the edge of the right-of-way to cover all signs visible from and erected 
with the purpose of being read from the main traveled way of the 
interstate or federal-aid primary system327 and would have eliminated 
any reference in subsection (d) to the 660 feet setback requirement.828 
Both the Senate and House versions of the 1972 Act would also 
have amended (I) subsection (e) so as to provide simply that "[a]ny 
nonconforming sign under State law enacted to comply with this. sec-
tion shall be removed no later than the end of the fifth year after it 
324. Pub. L. No. 93-6, 87 Stat. 6. 
325. S. 3939, § 122(g), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in ll8 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332 
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(g), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in ll8 
CoNG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). 
326. S. 3939, § 122(h), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in ll8 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332 
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(h), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in IIS 
CONG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). 
327. The Senate bill would have required imposition of the ten per cent penalty 
with respect to 
Federal-aid highway funds apportioned on or after January l, 1973, or after the ex-
piration of the next regular session of the State legislature, whichever is later, to 
any State which the Secretary [of Transportation] determines has not made provi-
sion for effective control of the erection and maintenance along the Interstate Sys-
tem and the primary system of those additional outdoor advertising signs ••• which 
are more than six hundred and sixty feet off the nearest edge of the right of way, 
visible from the main traveled way of the system, and erected with the purpose of 
their message being read from such main traveled way •.• until such time as such 
State shall provide for such effective control. 
S. 3939, § 122(a), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in ll8 CoNG. R.Ec. Sl5331-32 (daily 
ed. Sept. 19, 1972). 
The House bill would have imposed the ten per cent penalty only beginning with 
"Federal-aid highway funds apportioned on or after January 1, 1974, or after the ex-
piration of the next regular session of the State legislature •••• " H.R. 16656, § 120(a), 
passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118 CoNG. R.Ec. H9297 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). 
328. S. 3939, § 122(c), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in ll8 CoNG. R.Ec. Sl5332 
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(c), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in II8 
CONG. R.Ec. H9297-98 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). 
June 1973] Billboard Control 1367 
becomes nonconforming, except as determined by the Secretary;"329 
(2) subsection (£) by giving the Secretary the power to include areas 
"within the rights-of-way of the primary system" as areas "in which 
signs •.. giving- specific information in the interest of the traveling 
public may be erected and maintained;"380 (3) subsection (g) to read, 
"[j]ust compensation shall be paid upon the removal of any outdoor 
advertising sign ... lawfully erected under State law;"331 and would 
have added a new subsection (o): 
No directional sign ... lawfully in existence on June I, 1972, giving 
specific information in the interest of the traveling public shall be 
required to be removed until December 31, 1973, or until a State in 
which the sign ... is located certifies that the directional information 
about the service or activity advertised on such sign ... may reason-
ably be available to motorists by some other method or methods, 
whichever shall occur first.ss2 
In the current session of Congress, the federal-aid highway bill 
originally passed by the Senate333 contained amendments to title I 
of the Highway Beautification Act similar to those in the abortive 
1972 Act, and other amendments were proposed by the House com-
mittee.338a But the bill that emerged from the conference committee 
and was finally enacted into law contains no provisions relating to 
control of outdoor advertising, and it provides no new funding for 
fiscal years 1974-76.833b 
329. S. 3939, § 122(d), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CoNG. R.Ec. Sl5332 
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(d), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118 
CoNG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). 
330. S. 3939, § 122(e), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332 
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972): H.R. 16656, § 120(e), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118 
CoNG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). The House also would have prevented erection 
of such signs along the interstate and primary systems in urban or suburban areas in 
lieu of signs permitted by subsection (d) and where adequate information is provided 
by signs permitted by subsection (c). 
331. S. 3939, § 122(f), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332 
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(f), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118 
CoNG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). 
332. S. 3939, § 122(h), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332 
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(h), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118 
CONG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). 
333. S. 502, § 124, passed by the Senate, March 15, 1973, in 119 CONG. R.Ec. S4985 
(daily ed. March 15, 1973). 
333a. S. 502, § 120, reported by the House Comm. on Public Works, April 10, 1973. 
See H.R. REP. No. 93-118, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 78-81 (1973). 
333b. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 250. However, 
the conference report stressed: "The deletion of these provisions should not be con-
strued as discontinuing the programs or affecting the existing law. The present pro-
grams remain in effect. It is the expectation of the conferees that the Congress will 
consider additional authorizations and possible modifications in separate legislation." 
H.R. REP. No. 93-410, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1973). 
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Is title I of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, as some have 
declared, a "case study in legislative frustration"?334 With the benefit 
of hindsight, it is easy to say that our national policy with regard to 
highway advertising along the interstate system would have been bet-
ter served by a ban on advertising visible from the highways right 
from the start of the interstate construction program in the mid-
l 950's. Such a ban-with perhaps an exception for commercially or 
industrially zoned areas and areas actually developed for commercial 
or industrial use, as under the 1965 Act-would certainly have been 
justifiable in view of the facts that the federal government was to sup-
ply ninety per cent of the funding for the interstate system and that 
any advertising value attached to adjacent land would be entirely a 
result of the construction of the system with funds contributed by 
federal and state taxpayers. No landowner along a new interstate 
highway could reasonably claim any vested right to profit from the 
construction of the highway by using or leasing his land for advertis-
ing purposes, nor could any outdoor advertising company claim a 
vested right to profit from the construction of the highway by leasing 
adjacent land for advertising displays. 
Had the Congress originally decided to condition federal funding 
of the interstate system upon a state's total prohibition of advertising 
within view of the interstate highways (with the possible exceptions of 
the areas described above), there can be little doubt that construction 
of the system would have gone forward on schedule and the problem 
of eliminating lawfully erected but nonconforming signs along the 
interstate system-a problem that has seriously obstructed attempts 
to implement the Highway Beautification Act of 1965-would have 
been largely avoided. Thus, the congressional decision in 1958 to use 
the bonus approach to billboard control335 seems, in retrospect, to 
have been a serious mistake. Perhaps a larger bonus would have been 
more effective, 336 but prior to the passage of the Highway Beautifica-
tion Act of 1965 only twenty-five states had enacted billboard control 
legislation to qualify for the 1958 Act bonus,337 and some of these did 
not enact implementing legislation until 1965.338 Consequently, a 
334. See Lamm &: Yasinow, supra note 48. 
335. See note 7 supra. 
. 336. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, § 12, 72 Stat. 96, 
provided a bonus of only one half of one per cent for states that complied with the ad-
vertising control provisions of the Act. 
337. Lamm &: Yasinow, supra note 48, at 441. 
338. E.g., Ch. 828, [1965] Minn. Laws 1524, as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 173. 
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large number of billboards were in place along the interstate system 
by 1965, when the Highway Beautification Act came before the Con-
gress, and Congress then had to deal with the problem of eliminating 
existing billboards as well as the problem of preventing the future 
erection of billboards along interstate highways. Faced with these 
problems, it was probably inevitable that Congress would adopt the 
penalty approach, rather than the bonus approach, in the Act of 1965. 
Having settled on the penalty approach, should not Congress have 
adhered to the original proposal made by the 1965 Act's sponsors to 
allow the several states, to the extent constitutionally permissible, to 
remove existing billboards by the use of their police power, without 
payment of compensation? It seems fairly clear that the United States 
Constitution does not require payment of compensation, either to the 
owner of the sign or to the owner of the land on which the sign is 
located, upon removal of a nonconforming sign.339 Moreover, there 
is impressive authority in several states that state constitutional pro-
visions do not require payment of compensation upon the removal 
of such signs.340 Indeed, twenty-three of the twenty-five states that 
adopted legislation to qualify for the bonus under the Federal High-
way Act of 1958 chose to use the police power to eliminate existing 
nonconforming signs without payment of compensation.341 Arguably, 
therefore, Congress, in enacting the Highway Beautification Act of 
1965, should have allowed these twenty-three states, and any other 
01-.27 (Supp. 1973); ch. 260, [1965] Iowa Acts 408, as amended, IOWA CoDE ANN. 
§§ 306B.l-.8 (Supp. 1972). 
339. See, e.g., St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1915); Rcinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 
U.S. 171 (1915). See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). But see 
Art Neon Co. v. City &: County of Denver, 357 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973). 
340. Moore v. Ward, 377 S."W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 
268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Ct., Inc., 
10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghastcr Properties, Inc. v. Pres-
ton, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 
2d 405,439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969); Kclbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 
113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943). It is obvious that, if the courts should generally accept 
the Kelbro rationale, holding that there is no property right in the use of land for off-
premises advertising, no compensation would be constitutionally required when such 
advertising is removed. There arc cases upholding zoning ordinance provisions that re-
quire the discontinuance of nonconforming uses after an amortization period in the fol-
lowing states: California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New York, and 'Washington; unfavorable decisions in zoning cases have been 
handed down in Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina, and 
Texas. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 42,- at 42-43 nn.349-68 and accompanying text. 
Elimination of nonconforming highway advertising signs without payment of compen-
sation was held unconstitutional in State Highway Dept. v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 
S.E.2d 372 (1966). 
341. Lamm &: Yasinow, supra note 48, at 441 n.23. 
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states that wished to follow their lead, to rely upon the police power, 
while providing financial assistance for those states where judicial in-
terpretation of state constitutional provisions might require the pay-
ment of just compensation upon the removal of nonconforming signs. 
This approach was contemplated in the 1965 Act as originally intro-
duced. 
Despite the apparent advantages of this approach, Congress' deci-
sion to require payment of compensation upon the removal of non-
conforming billboards is both understandable and defensible. In the 
first place, the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 was intended to 
control billboards along the federal-aid primary highways, as well as 
along the interstate system. The highway advertising industry, and 
the roadside businesses dependent on highway advertising, had grown 
up with the primary system over a period of forty to fifty years, and 
there was a strong feeling in the Congress that advertising rights along 
these highways were vested property rights, which ought not be 
destroyed without payment of just compensation.842 This feeling was 
frequently expressed in committee hearings and in the floor debates 
with respect to existing signs along both systems,843 but the feeling 
seems to have been stronger with respect to the primary system. And 
this feeling has a strong jurisprudential basis in the fundamental con-
siderations of fairness so well analyzed by Professor Michelman in his 
recent article on the ethical foundations of just compensation law.844 
It would have been possible, of course, to treat nonconforming 
billboards along the interstate system differently from those along the 
primary system, authorizing billboard removal along the interstate 
system by means of the police power, without compensation, while 
requiring payment of compensation for removal of billboards along 
the primary system. But this would certainly have raised a serious 
equal protection problem. 
All things considered, the basic pattern of title I of the High-
way Beautification Act, as finally enacted, may well be the best 
that could be devised, given the failure of the Congress to prohibit 
the erection of billboards along the new interstate system from the 
time of its inception in the mid-1950's and the strong desire of the 
Johnson Administration to make billboard controls along the inter-
state system more effective and to extend such controls to the federal-
342. 1965 SENATE R.El'ORT, supra note 20, at 15 (individual views of Sen. Cooper). 
343. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra. 
344. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967). 
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aid primary system. In any case, the billboard control program now 
appears, after a seven-year delay, to be a going concern, with all ,but 
one of the states (according to the Secretary of Transportation) now 
fully in compliance with title I, 345 substantial federal funding avail-
able, 846 and many states actively engaged in removing nonconforming 
billboards as contemplated by the 1965 Act. The Federal Highway 
Administration expects the removal process to be completed by the 
end of 1978 if federal funding continues at the current level, with a 
total cost of 250 to 300 million dollars.847 
It must be conceded, however, that title I of the Highway Beautifi-
cation Act is one of the worst-drafted pieces of legislation ever to 
emerge from the Congress. Most of its defects have been discussed in 
detail earlier in this Article.848 One major defect not yet discussed 
should now be mentioned: the fact that, although it was generally ex-
pected that the 660-foot setback requirement would be sufficient to 
achieve the purposes of title I, congressional expectations have been 
frustrated by the erection of giant billboards just beyond that setback. 
As the Senate Committee on Public Works reported last £all, "Clearly 
readable from the highways, these signs are visible for a longer period 
of time and dominate landscape to a greater degree than do signs of 
conventional size located closer to the highways."349 In view of this 
fact, it would certainly be highly desirable for Congress at its current 
session to adopt the amendment to title I proposed in the abortive 
Federal Highway Act of 1972 changing the definition of "effective 
control ... of outdoor advertising" in subsection (b) to cover all 
billboards visible from the main traveled way and erected with the 
purpose of being read from the highway.850 
Congress should also adopt a second proposed amendment, which 
345. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 15. 
846. Total funding for the fiscal years 1971-73 is 97.5 million dollars. Although the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 250, provides no new 
funds, there are about 35 million dollars in prior authorizations that can be carried 
over. Of the 61 million dollars that has been allocated to the states, about 56 million 
dollars has been committed to projects. Telephone conversation with George Mcin-
turff, Chief, Scenic Enhancement Division, Federal Highway Administration, Aug. 29, 
1973. 
347. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-5.2, supra note 41, 1J IO(c). 
348. See text accompanying notes 17-114 supra. 
349. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 14. This statement and the Committee's 
recommendation that title I be amended to control signs visible from the main traveled 
way of the interstate and federal-aid primary systems were based on the interim report 
of the Commission on Highway Beautification, supra note 322, at 3. 
350. It would seem that the word "visible" supplies a sufficiently definite standard. 
But see Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commn., 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d 719 (1954). 
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provides for seventy-five per cent federal participation in paying com-
pensation for the removal of nonconforming signs lawfully erected 
after October 22, 1965, and prior to January l, 1968, thus rendering 
it unnecessary for the states to pay the entire cost of removing such 
signs.351 This latter problem is a result of the fact that the just com-
pensation directive of subsection (g) of title I does not apply to such 
signs. Apparently the omission was intentional, since the lack of any 
federal participation in the payment of compensation for removal of 
signs erected in that period might be expected to induce the states to 
move rapidly to enact legislation implementing title I, thereby re-
ducing the period in which signs could be lawfully erected. However, 
many states did not enact implementing legislation for several years, 
and although highway advertising companies and other highway ad-
vertisers were put on notice by subsection (g) that there would be no 
federal funds to pay compensation for new signs erected along the in-
terstate and primary highways between October 22, 1965, and Jan-
uary 1, 1968, many signs were erected during that period. It will be 
very hard for any state to deny compensation to sign owners and land-
owners if and when these lawfully erected nonconforming signs are 
removed,352 particularly since the Act requires each state to pay com-
pensation upon the removal of any sign lawfully erected on or after 
January I, 1968, even though no state advertising control statute was 
in force when the sign was erected.353 If a state refuses compensation 
for signs erected between October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968, and 
pays compensation for signs erected on or after the latter date, the 
equal protection problem will certainly be substantial.854 Such a 
distinction is quite illogical. And it is grossly unfair to deny fed-
eral participation in the payment of compensation for the removal 
of signs erected between October 22, 1965, and the date when a par-
ticular state enacted an advertising control statute-especially where 
the state legislature did not meet until 1967 and hence had no oppor-
tunity to adopt an advertising control statute making certain signs 
unlawful until more than a year after the enactment of title 1.855 
351. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 14-15. 
352. Many state compliance laws do, in fact, provide for payment of compensation 
upon removal of any nonconforming sign lawfully in existence at the date of enactment 
of the statute. See text accompanying note 178 supra. 
353. This is required under subsection (g) if the state is to comply with title I and 
avoid the ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b). 
354. See text accompanying notes 265-66 supra. 
355. See text accompanying note 331 supra, dealing with the proposed 1972 amend-
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Subsection (c) of title I should be amended to subject on-
premises advertising· signs within areas adjacent to the interstate 
and federal-aid primary systems to reasonable size, lighting, and spac-
ing standards. Sin:ce subsection (c) contains no such standards and 
does not authorize the Secretary to promulgate such standards, it 
would appear that on-premises signs are not now subject to any such 
controls unless state or local governments on their own initative im-
pose them. The federal standards for spacing of on-premises advertis-
ing signs, originally promulgated to implement the bonus provisions 
of the 1958 Federal-Aid Highway Act, do not seem to apply to the on-
premises advertising signs permitted by title I of the Highway Beau-
tification Act. Yet, it would seem essential with respect to the preser-
vation of natural beauty and scenic amenity that on-premises signs 
be subject to reasonable standards.356 Perhaps these should be left 
for development through negotiated agreements between the states 
and the Secretary of Transportation, but unhappy experience 
with the negotiating process suggests the desirability of promulgating 
federal standards, as in the case of directional and other official signs. 
Subsection (g) should be amended to make it clear whether 
the owner of land on which a nonconforming sign is located is to be 
compensated for the taking of his advertising rights in perpetuity, or 
only for the taking of his rights under an existing advertising lease.857 
The latter alternative would seem to be preferable, since the states 
can use their police power to prohibit the making of any new adver-
tising leases after expiration of existing leases. And, finally, the rela-
tionship of the recently enacted Uniform Relocation Assistance and 
Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970358 to the compensation re-
quirements of subsection (g) should be clarified. 
If the suggested changes are made in title I of the Highway Beau-
ment of the first sentence of subsection (g) of title I to provide simply that "[j]ust com-
pensation shall be paid upon the removal of any outdoor advertising sign ••• lawfully 
erected under State law." In addition to the objections to the present language of sub-
section (g) pointed out in the text, the report on S. 3939 points out that "[a]nother 
problem has arisen because of a misunderstanding over the meaning of the term 'law-
fully erected' for signs erected after January I, 1968." 1972 SENATE REI'oRT, supra note 
130, at 14. 
356. The Commission on Highway Beautification in its interim report, supra note 
322, at 8, says: "From testimony at the Commission's hearings, it appears that in some 
jurisdictions there is a need for improved control over location, design, construction and 
maintenance of on-premise signs." 
357. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra. 
358. Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1601-55 (1970)). 
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tification Act, it would seem that the final elimination of the bill-
board blight that has for so long afflicted American highways may at 
last be in sight. The estimated cost of 250 to 300 million dollars 
would be a modest price to pay to achieve that elusive goal. 
